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 This paper looks at the increasingly important role corporate legal 
compliance is taking in multinational corporations. It provides background 
information on corporate governance legislation and the resulting motivation for 
corporations developing legal compliance departments. The focus then turns to 
topics of particular interest to corporations involved in international commerce: 
antitrust compliance, bribery & corrupt practices, and anti-money laundering. These 
topics are illuminated by case law, statutes, and policy papers from around the 
world, but should be considered keeping United States legal and business practice as 
a foundation. With this in mind, this paper argues that what once was viewed as 
overly cumbersome U.S. corporate business practice is now becoming the standard 
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 The layman imagines that a lawyer's work is limited to the confines of a 
courtroom, when in fact there is a diversity of settings in which a lawyer can be 
found. One of the least known settings for lawyers, even amongst legal 
professionals, is the world of corporate legal compliance management. This field, 
often categorized under "regulatory affairs," "preventive law", or simply 
"compliance," is in expansion and consequently in need of a growing number of 
legal professionals proficient in compliance-related subject areas. Legal compliance 
is interdisciplinary in that it is a combination of law, risk management, business 
ethics, governance, and often, knowledge of a specific sector (examples include 
sustainability, technology or banking). It is also an increasingly international field as 
companies spread their cross-border holdings and dealings, bringing into play a host 
of potential legal liabilities depending upon the legislative landscape in question. 
The complexity of managing these legal comings-and-goings is the responsibility of 
corporate legal departments (i.e. "in house" counsel) that liaise with the departments 
of risk management and internal audit. However, the increase of legislation related to 
corporate dealings resulting from the large corporate collapses characteristic of the 
later half of the 20th century has led to the creation of independent legal compliance 
departments within many multinational corporations.  These departments are 
charged with creating a database of relevant existing and emerging legislation and 
ensuring the duties arising from such legislation are understood and practiced by the 
business' board, management, and staff.  Legal compliance is thus a set of policies 
and related procedures/practices that, in combination, are intended to prevent and 
detect wrongdoing.1  
 As the field of legal compliance has grown, so has the number of entities 
contributing to refining how it is practiced. For decades, legal compliance was not 
only a sub-division of legal departments as previously mentioned, but also a sub-
category of what has come to be known as corporate governance. In the United 
States context, large-scale and meaningful attention to corporate governance only 
appeared in the 1980s and legal compliance is only now receiving full treatment by 
legal scholars. It is becoming clear that legal compliance is no longer a peripheral 
matter, but one that is of increasing importance to corporations whose success is 
linked to its ability to link profitable corporate behaviour with the ethical behaviour 
                                                
1 American Bar Association (ABA) Committee on Corporate Counsel, The In-House 












prescribed by the law. For multinational corporations, the complications are 
amplified by factors such as conflicting overseas legislation, enforcement authority, 
and local culture and practice. As multinational corporations have become more 
familiar with the requirements of compliance legislation, there appears to be a 
convergence in practice that is being reflected in the surge of policy papers 
recommending standardization of corporate legal compliance across the globe. This 
paper aims to provide a survey of the world of corporate legal compliance by 
providing (1) the reasoning behind establishing a legal compliance department, (2) a 
discussion of compliance topics unique to multinational corporations, (3) an expose 
of a sector-specific compliance program (4) an analysis of an actual corporate 
compliance scandal and (5) a few notes on emerging legal compliance personalities 
and tools.    
 
 The first chapter will outline the principles that have given rise to the 
contemporary corporate legal compliance regime. Legal compliance management is 
a system targeted at avoiding or reducing corporate legal responsibility, otherwise 
known as corporate liability. It is thus important to have an understanding of how 
corporations came to be legally responsible parties, a phenomenon that will be 
demonstrated via an exploration of seminal cases and legislation in various 
jurisdictions.  Next, there will be an evaluation of how these laws on corporate 
liability have been incorporated into corporate legal compliance programs: this has 
mostly been reflected in increased attention and enforcement of corporate codes of 
conduct. Last, there will be a discussion of the benefits of establishing an effective 
legal compliance program which will focus primarily on the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines that incentivize the creation of such programs.  
 The second chapter will profile legal compliance topics that are distinctly 
international in nature. The activities chronicled here require legal compliance 
professionals to cooperate with multiple bodies on both a local and international 
level. While there are several topics that could be included here, Antitrust 
Compliance and Bribery & Corrupt Practices are the most prominent and have been 
selected.   
 The third chapter will chronicle the banking sector in order to provide a 
complete view of how legal compliance works in one type of multinational 












paper, the Anti-Money Laundering compliance regime will be covered in its entirety: 
core legislation, key training and investigative programs, international cooperative 
efforts, and consequences for those who undermine the regime.  
 The fourth chapter will delve into a case study pulled from contemporary 
corporate practice that demonstrates the importance of implementing the elements 
necessary to an effective   corporate compliance program. The unique feature of this 
segment is that the case study will be structured in form of a "standard form" legal 
compliance assessment; these assessments compile and control information about 
company operations within a particular business context and taps employee 
communication networks, in order to report wrongdoing and prevent disputes.  
 The concluding fifth chapter will provide a glimpse into emerging topics 
within the corporate compliance sphere. Of particular importance is the rise of a new 
corporate personality that straddles the business and legal arms of the corporation, 
traditionally known as the corporate ombudsman.  Last, the role of e-compliance in 
the Internet age will be touched upon.  
   
 Ultimately, this thesis has been organized in a manner that will provide a 
good grounding of the world of corporate legal compliance management to the 
uninitiated legal professional. Chapter 1 will outline the principles giving rise to and 
currently characterizing corporate compliance, Chapter 2 will highlight corporate 
compliance activities in the international context, Chapter 3 will unify the discussion 
via an expose of a complete compliance program in a specific-sector, Chapter 4 will 
provide a case study taken from contemporary corporate practice, and Chapter 5 will 
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I. Corporate liability 
(a) Principles of corporate liability 
 In a culture dominated by headlines featuring corporate defendants and their 
alleged offenses, it is no surprise that there is a general idea that the ability to impute 
legal liability to a corporation has always been a viable legal option. However, this is 
a 20th century phenomenon that represents a change from the common law rule that 
viewed corporations as legal fictions2. As commercial exchanges began to be 
managed by corporate entities instead of individual tradesmen, the United States 
Supreme Court felt it was time to abandon the doctrine that corporations were not 
indictable. From this point on, not only could corporations be held liable for "crimes 
committed or authorized by those at the policy-making level of the corporate 
hierarchy, but also for the criminal acts of subordinate—even menial—employees."3 
, In New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States, the Court held: 
It is now well established that in actions for tort the corporation 
may be held responsible for damages for the acts of its agent with 
the scope of his employment...[T]he liability is not imputed 
because the principal actually participates in the malice or fraud, 
but because the act is done for the benefit of the 
principal...Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go 
only a step further in holding that the act of the agent, while 
exercising the authority delegated to him...may be controlled, in 
the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer 
and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is 
acting...4 
 
In so holding, the door was open for the development of public policy directed at 
incentivizing corporations to maintain strict control over their operations.   
 This public policy doctrine substantially broadened the responsibility of 
corporations under even the most classic common law doctrines, such as respondeat 
superior. "A corporation may also be found liable for illegal activities of an 
employee, even if there is no benefit to the corporation, where the risk was created 
by the very activity of the employee that the employer should have foreseen (e.g., a 
                                                
2 Theodore L. Banks and Frederick Z. Banks, Corporate Legal Compliance 
Handbook, 2nd Edition p. 1-7 (2012). 
3 Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corporate 
Counsel,  40 Bus. Law. 129, p. 1 (1984). 
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bouncer at a nightclub who uses excessive force.)"5 In a large corporation however, 
it is often difficult to prove the exact scope of employment of an employee or even 
accurately pinpoint the nature of a situation involving chains of command that are 
long and removed from the place where a violation may have occurred.6 If one adds 
to this an international element, establishing corporate liability under respondeat 
superior becomes even more complex: 
"The principle of legal separation of the parent corporations from 
their subsidiaries, and even more so from their supply chains, 
makes the mechanisms of vicarious liability...useful only to a very 
limited extent...[It] does not come into play in those situations 
where the physical integrity of the employee or the local 
population was affected through acts such as assault or battery 
committed by employees, unless the use of force was part of their 
employment...Generally, it would not apply, for instance, to 
situations of collusion of interests between a repressive regime 
and a transnational corporation..."7 
 
The complexity of the international corporate context—social, economic or legal—
contacts blurs the clarity that is necessary to unequivocally establish corporate 
liability under respondeat superior.  
 In view of the foregoing, courts have utilized lesser-known doctrines to 
establish corporate liability. Some US courts have established corporate liability by 
simultaneous application of the doctrine of identification and collective knowledge. 
"The doctrine of identification is a common law test developed from a series of fraud 
cases which marked the recognition of corporations as capable of committing 
offences that required proof of a mental element (mens rea)."8 To establish this 
mental element, the doctrine of "collective knowledge" can be used when no 
particular corporate agent can be identified to establish liability.9 In such cases, 
pieces of knowledge can be taken from a collection of individual agents to establish 
the requisite mens rea for corporate liability.10 As a result, in some jurisdictions, 
                                                
5 Banks, supra, at 1-12. 
6 Ed. Doreen McBarnet et al. The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law, "Changing paradigms of corporate criminal 
responsibility: lessons for corporate social responsibility"  p. 405 (2007). 
7 Ibid, p. 405. 
8 Ibid, p. 406. 
9 Banks, supra, p. 1-12. 
10 Anthony Ragozino, Replacing the Collective Knowledge Doctrine with a Better 
Theory for Establishing Corporate Mens Rea: The Duty Stratification Approach, 24 
Sw. U. L. Rev. 425,  
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corporations can theoretically be charged with offenses such as manslaughter, 
typically reserved for natural persons. As the 20th century progressed and the 
number of corporate scandals surged, even on the international level, numerous other 
corporate liability paradigms gained prominence. 
 While corporate liability is treated in an especially aggressive manner in the 
United States, other countries have also made efforts to regulate corporate behaviour, 
usually via administrative or civil laws.11 The international approach often diverges 
from the US model in terms of both impetus and intention. Using the Republic of 
South Africa as an example, scholarly commentary on corporate liability is based 
less in a desire to impose onerous punitive measures on corporations consistently 
engaging in improper conduct, but more in reassuring potential investors of the 
stability of South African corporations and its overall economy. 12 This approach is 
reflected in their corporate liability legislation where the Companies Act and 
Criminal Procedure Act, in relationship with the Constitution of 1996 form the legal 
basis for corporate business entities. Section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977 provides for the prosecution of corporations and members of associations: 
For the purpose of imposing upon a corporate body criminal 
liability for any offence, whether under any law or at common 
law- 
a) any act performed, with or without a particular intent, by 
or on instructions or with permission, express or implied, given 
by a director or servant of that corporate body; and 
b) the omission, with or without particular intent, of any act 
which ought to have been but was not performed by or on 
instructions given by a director or servant of that corporate body, 
in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as 
such director or servant, or in furthering or endeavoring to further 
the interests of that corporate body, shall be deemed to have been 
performed (and with the same intent, if any) by that corporate 
body, or, as the case may be, to have been an omission (and with 
the same intent, if any) on the part of that corporate body. 
 
Other jurisdictions, less focused on punitive elements, are in line with this 
articulation of what constitutes corporate liability as it highlights the fact that 
corporations must pay close attention to their every move, as regulations pertaining 
                                                
 
11"What makes America so unique is that it imposes significant criminal liability in 
addition to those administrative and civil regulations." From: Edward B. Diskant, 
Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American 
Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 Yale L.J. 126, p. 5 (2008). 
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to them are "not based on strict definition of the specified result, as with most legal 
regulations, but the mere lack of protecting for any potential harm emanating from 
their actions."13 More clearly, this legislation articulates corporate liability for both 
positive and negative action (i.e. "act" or "omission") that ultimately benefits the 
corporation.14  Legislation of this kind is practical in the domestic context, but 
establishing global legislation with a potential for impact on multinational 
corporations has resulted in the international legal regime adopting a softer 
approach: the principles of corporate governance.  
 
(b) The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Corporate Governance  
 The global acceptance of some form of corporate liability is a legal given and 
has been expressed through various mechanisms, but none have attempted to provide 
corporations with specific guidelines on practices they could incorporate to shield 
themselves from wrongdoing.  
The United States Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)15 not only provides guidelines, but 
imposes corporate governance standards on U.S. corporations and those listed on 
U.S. stock indexes. "SOX is not a freestanding statute. Instead, it is built upon the 
existing framework of state corporation codes and federal securities laws that have 
long governed corporate governance."16  
The first version of SOX was passed in 2002 and has since been amended several 
times as corporations still found ways to outmanoeuvre the legislation in place.  It is 
a very comprehensive piece of legislation in that it touched the workings of not only 
publicly held corporations17, but also their external auditors/accountants: 
                                                
13 Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, p. 6 (2001).  
14 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (South Africa), Section 332 (1).  
15 Formally known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002 (USA), Pub.L. 107–204. 
16 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Complete Guide to Sarbanes-Oxley: Understanding 
How SOX Affects your Business p. 21 (2007).  
17 "Most of SOX's key operative provisions apply only to reporting companies, that 
is, corporations required to register with the SEC, or in colloquial terms, public 
corporations. Out of 4 million-plus corporations in the US, SOX therefore directly 
affects only about 13,000-odd corporations...Two of SOX's provisions---those 
relating to document destruction and protection of whistleblowers--apply not only to 
reporting companies, but also closely held businesses and nonprofit entities. In 
addition, many nonprofits and small businesses comply voluntarily with many SOX 
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SOX fashioned several different mechanisms to address 
the most egregious corporate practices that undermined 
investor confidence in both independent audits and the 
financial markets more generally. SOX created an 
independent regulatory framework for accounting firms 
serving public companies, constructed measures to 
ensure the independence of outside auditors, 
strengthened the requirements of corporate governance 
and responsibility, enacted measures designed to 
increase transparency of financial reporting, bolstered 
the independence of securities analysts, and expanded 
existing civil and criminal remedies and penalties for 
securities laws violations. 18 
 
In sum, corporate governance oversight powers—notably audit and certification— 
that were once strictly private sector issues, now fall within federal government legal 
authority as a result of the statute. While many of the provisions of SOX do not 
touch the everyday activities of corporations, there are several sections that are of 
importance to legal compliance departments. These sections include the creation of 
new administrative bodies to which corporate compliance departments must report, 
new regulations aimed specifically at corporate executives19, and federally 
established standards for the content of corporate codes of ethics.  
 The three administrative bodies created under SOX have been criticized for 
being primarily investigative agencies that automatically assume corporations are 
SOX violators. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCOAB) was 
created as a nonprofit corporation whose objective is to oversee auditing roles once 
left to private firms20.  More overt in their corporate "prejudice" is the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) who established the Corporate Fraud Task Force that 
attends to the criminal provisions of SOX legislation21. The taskforce also has 
monitoring responsibilities in that it "provides direction and recommendations for 
the investigation and prosecution of cases of corporate fraud and other financial 
                                                
18 Banks, supra, p. 3-6. 
19 Executive status is usually determined by evaluating corporate pay grades. 
20 The irony is that corporations now pay outside auditors and a SOX-created 
"accounting support fee" that funds PCOAB operations. From: Bainbridge, supra, 
p.187 
21 The Securities and Exchange Commission can only contend with 











The Foundations of Corporate Legal Compliance 
 
 9 
crimes."22 The last administrative body is less a separate entity and more an 
expansion of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); this new department 
is charged with overseeing lateral organizations whose operations indirectly 
influence corporate behaviour. For example, a responsibility assigned to the new 
SEC section is the oversight and approval of any rule changes by the various 
securities exchanges (i.e. NYSE/NASDAQ).23 The DOJ Corporate Fraud Task Force 
and the expanded SEC section are of special interest to compliance professionals 
because they interpret and clarify the SOX compliance regime. In general, these 
administrative bodies are important for corporate compliance departments because 
they all serve as evaluators of the effectiveness of compliance programs. Cultivating 
a strong relationship with these government administrators could improve a 
corporation's standing in the regulatory sphere and reduce the unkindly view of 
corporations by oversight entities.  
 The next important section of SOX for compliance professionals relates to its 
regulation of people within the corporate entity. SOX elaborated strict rules for the 
behaviour of internal accountants/auditors, attorneys and executives. Again, we set 
aside the accounting aspect because this paper is directed more toward the 
obligations of legal compliance professionals.24 Beginning with attorneys, SOX 
regulations were incorporated into the Rules of Professional Responsibility for 
Attorneys thus normalizing the standards for all US bar-qualified legal practitioners. 
SOX Section 307 established what is known as an "up the ladder" reporting 
obligation. Should an attorney25 have reasonable suspicion26 of a SOX provision27 
                                                
22 Banks, supra, p. 3-16. 
23 A task previously privately regulated by the securities exchanges exclusively. 
24 "SOX stressed an increased role for the audit committee and a decreased role for 
company management in overseeing the audit process. The practical result of this 
shift of power is that the audit committee changed from a fringe player in the 
financial reporting process essentially to an inspector general of the company's 
finances, with its own budget and the power to hire independent counsel and 
advisers." From: Banks, supra, p. 3-32. 
25 In deciding whether to report information, the rule considers an attorney's 
professional skills, background, experience, including previous experience and 
familiarity with the client at issue, time constraints, and the availability of other 
lawyers with whom the lawyer may have been able to consult. From Banks, supra, p. 
3-61. 
26 The definition of  "reasonable" and "reasonably believes" can be found in SEC 
Release No. 33-8185 or 33-8150. 
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violation, they must report along the following chain until appropriate corrective 
measures are taken:  (1) to the chief legal officer or CEO (2) the audit 
committee/committee of independent directors (3) the full board of directors.  A 
hallmark of SOX Section 307 is the last resort measure, the "noisy withdrawal," 
required of attorneys should none of the above entities respond to attorney's 
reasonable suspicions28.  The "noisy withdrawal" applies to both outside and in-
house counsel: 
For outside counsel, this meant withdrawing from representation 
of the company, notifying the SEC of the withdrawal, and 
disaffirming documents filed with the SEC that the attorney 
believes violate securities laws, fiduciary obligations or other 
similar violations. For in-house counsel, only the last step--
disaffirming "tainted" documents filed with the SEC--would be 
required.29 
 
This particular provision has come under fire and the final word on its future within 
the Rules of Professional Responsibility is still in question. In sum, some scholars 
have described this as a form of imposed legal "sabre rattling" on attorneys that 
undermines the unity of executive departments (legal vs. the rest) required for sound 
compliance with governance rules.  
 While SOX may have introduced certain burdens on bar-qualified legal 
professionals, corporate executives bore even greater responsibilities under the 
statute while simultaneously losing fringe benefits they had long enjoyed. SOX 
Sections 302 and 906 introduced principal executive and financial officer 
certification requirements that if breached incur civil (S 302) or criminal penalties (S 
906). "SOX Section 302 made those signing the certification [annual or quarterly 
reports] directly responsible for the fair presentation of material in their company's 
financial reports."30 This certification is required across the board and its 
wording/substance cannot stray from that provided by the SEC, examples include: 
1. The signing officer has reviewed the report. 
2.  Based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain 
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of 
                                                
28 The noisy withdrawal was initially included in the SOX rules, but was 
subsequently withdrawn. I include it because of current scholarly debate involving 
whether it should be reinstituted. See: Banks, supra. p. 3-59, p. 3-63. 
29 Ibid., p. 3-59.  
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the circumstances under which such statements were made, not 
misleading. 
6. The signing officers have indicated in the report whether or not 
there were significant changes in internal controls or in other 
factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent 
to the date of their evaluation, including any corrective actions 
with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.31 
 
SOX Section 906 is directed specifically toward CEOs and CFOs, as opposed to 
principal executive officers in general, and mirrors SOX 302 in wording and 
substance. However, this section is seen to be more serious as false certifications 
(and thus, those who falsely certify) can incur monetary penalties accompanied by 
prison sentences of up to 20 years. The degree of the penalty is based upon whether 
false certification was done knowingly, willingly, or at worst, both.32 These 
executive certification requirements enter into the gamut of legal compliance 
professionals because of their duty to ensure that all levels of management are 
following SOX corporate governance provisions. This core compliance department 
task entails having full knowledge of executive officer duties, collecting from 
throughout the corporation the requisite information the executive needs to be in 
compliance with such duties, and finally, ensuring communication and performance 
of these last to executives.  
 The importance of the corporate governance regimen prescribed by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is not due to its apparent rigor but due to its "symbolic 
statement of intent."33 Despite having one of the most comprehensive corporate law 
regimes in the world prior to SOX, "US regulatory structures were incapable of 
instilling credible ethical restraints."34 The passage of the act was the main indicator 
that corporations were going to need to make significant and meaningful changes to 
their internal operations should they wish to steer clear from conduct for which they 




                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., p. 3-47. 
33 Ali Gregoriou. International Corporate Governance After Sarbanes-Oxley p. 14 
(2006).  
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II Corporate integration of corporate governance legislation 
 In light of the changes in corporate governance standards, corporations have 
expanded their legal compliance departments to grapple with the onslaught of 
legislation and more importantly, instil an ethical business culture within the 
organization. Consequently, legal compliance departments have been endowed with 
more authority as government authorities have forced companies to move away from 
"rote lists of figures" and to more descriptive disclosure of their operations.35 With 
this new authority, legal compliance departments are slowly fulfilling their charge 
primarily through corporate legal training programs and the creation of carefully 
crafted corporate codes of conduct.  
 
(a) Training Programs 
 What distinguishes the legal compliance department from traditional legal/in-
house counsel within an organization is the range of effective communication 
expected from the compliance end. While in-house counsel can simply concentrate 
on legalese, compliance professionals must be able to translate legal terminology 
into accessible English. "The language should be clear and understandable by 
employees, but not so informal that it will not be taken seriously."36 Compliance 
departments use this "accessible English" to produce a variety of training materials: 
presentations, written support materials, audiovisual support, and in some cases skit-
writing using hired actors.37  An effective compliance training program is best 
summarized in the following passage: 
"A compliance communications program has multiple purposes. It 
should convey substantive legal information so that employees 
will do the right thing and also tell employees what to do if 
something happens, or where to go if they have a question. 
Employees should feel comfortable going to the law department 
to seek guidance. If they are comfortable with the legal staff and 
know how to find an attorney, they will be. This is all part of 
reinforcing (or creating) a culture of compliance."38 
 
(b) Corporate Codes of Conducts 
                                                
35 Inside the Minds Series, SEC Compliance Best Practices: Leading Lawyers on 
Understanding Disclosure Requirements, Developing Compliance Procedures, and 
Advising Clients on Reporting Practices p. 19 (2009).  
36 Banks, supra, p. 17-3. 
37 Ibid., p. 17-12. 
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 In the last decade, the most visible impact compliance departments have had 
on corporations can be seen in the increased emphasis on the creation and 
application of Codes of Conduct.39 A code of conduct is a "distinct and formal 
document containing a set of prescriptions developed by and for a company to guide 
present and future behaviour on multiple issues of at least its managers and 
employees toward one another, the company, external stakeholders and/or society in 
general."40  The classical legal amongst legal scholars has been that codes of conduct 
create moral obligations but have no real legal enforceability.41 Good compliance 
departments however, recognize a shift in contemporary legal commentary that leads 
to a different conclusion:  
"There is plenty of scope in law...to transform not just voluntary 
CSR reports, but also voluntary codes of conduct, into standards 
to which companies can be held legally accountable." A 2005 
European Directive specifically, if in somewhat limiting terms, 
includes non-compliance by a company with its code of conduct 
as an instance of misleading commercial practice...leading [one] 
to ask whether private codes of conduct can really be seen as 
voluntary rather than legally binding."42  
 
In light of the above, corporate legal compliance departments must make sure to 
draft codes of conduct that consider legal frameworks, stakeholder expectations and 
a corporation's ability to commit to the standards they publically espouse.43  
 Corporations around the world have drafted Codes of Conduct that are 
readily available on their websites, usually under "governance" or "compliance" 
headings. Entitling these corporate documents "codes" is perhaps misleading, as they 
are less an assembly of rules and more a list of principles corporations aim to 
embody. This follows the consensus of legal scholars who have concluded that the 
best corporate codes should not be "prophylactic:" 
While there may be a temptation to enact a strict and 
comprehensive code, the temptation to cover absolutely 
                                                
39 Other names for equivalent documents include: code of conduct, business 
principles, corporate credo, corporate philosophy, corporate ethics statement or code 
of practice.  
40 Muel Kapstein, The Effectiveness of Business Codes: A Critical Examination of 
Existing Studies and the Development of an Integrated Research Model, 77 J. Bus. 
Ethics 111, p.113 (2008).  
41 Doreen McBarnet, The New Corporate Accountability, "Corporate codes of 
conduct: moral or legal obligation?" p. 120 (2009). 
42 McBarnet, supra, p. 41. 
43 Ed. Kernaghan Webb, Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest 
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everything in great detail should be avoided. It is usually best to 
establish broad principles of ethical behavior and provide a 
mechanism for employees to review conduct, rather than try to 
prohibit everything, which may require granting frequent 
exceptions to code application as it is discovered that the overly 
prophylactic rules go beyond control of any ethical risks.44 
 
In drafting non-rules based codes, legal professionals should take special note 
because it could be counterintuitive to those accustomed to creating rules-based 
regimes. As a result, legal compliance professionals must widen their normal 
"sources of law," bypassing strict attention to hard law45 and also considering 
secondary sources such as model business principles and cutting-edge policy papers 
on corporate best-practice and governance published by non-state actors (i.e. legal 
think tanks, industry-specific organizations, etc...).46 The most sophisticated legal 
compliance departments also have mechanisms that allow the public at large to 
comment on their codes of conduct to ensure that they are in tune with what is 
relevant to today's fast-paced business environment. For multinational corporations, 
the use of secondary sources is especially important because they seem to best 
capture globally agreed-upon business governance standards. 
 Taking into consideration several corporate codes of conduct from 
multinational corporations, it becomes apparent that there is indeed a normalization 
of approach by legal compliance departments. For comparison, we look to the Codes 
of Conduct of McDonald's47, NIKE, Inc.48, and Arcelor Mittal group49. All 
corporations have a corporate governance or compliance section prominently 
displayed on their websites, uniformly translated into the native language of all 
markets influenced by their corporate conduct. Differences between the corporations 
                                                
44 Banks, supra, p. 15-4. 
45 Defined as legislation, statutes, codes, case law and other active and applicable 
legal rules. 
46 The most prominent secondary sources for multinational corporations include the 
American Legal Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, UN Global Compact, and the Council of 
Institutional Investors Policies on Corporate Governance. 
47 McDonald's Standard of Business Conduct for Employees, available at 
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/investors/corporate_governance/codes_of_co
nduct/standards_of_business_conduct.html. 
48 Nike, Inc. Compliance, available at http://nikeinc.com/pages/compliance. 
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lay only in the ambition compliance departments have displayed in the scope of their 
codes of conduct.  
Standard procedure within these codes includes first, a declaration of the 
corporation's ethical standpoint, followed by a selection of rules and fact-patterns 
whose objective is to guide employee conduct to within the law. Examples from the 
corporations referred to prior follow:  
McDonald's is committed to conducting business ethically and in 
compliance with the letter and spirit of the law. This commitment 
is reflected in McDonald's Values. Inherent in each value is our 
commitment to be ethical, truthful and dependable and this is 
reflected through our Standards of Business Conduct which 
serves as a guide to making good decisions and conducting 
business ethically.50 
 
Our greatest responsibility as a global company is to play a role in 
bringing about positive, systemic change for workers within our 
supply chain and in the industry. When we look at our overall 
impact on the world, the needs of nearly 1 million workers in 
Nike’s contract supply chain overshadows any other group. We 
also know the size and scale of the combined manufacturing 
operations has a considerable environmental impact. Since our 
Code was first adopted in 1991, it has evolved to provide 
consistency, clarity and alignment across NIKE, Inc., and the 
industry. It remains a straightforward statement of values, 
intentions and expectations meant to guide decisions in 
factories.51 
 
Good governance is a guiding principle at ArcelorMittal. Our 
definition of good governance has three main elements. First, it 
means ensuring compliance with the external regulations and 
reporting requirements that come with being a listed company. 
Second, good governance is about having a continuous dialogue 
with our stakeholders, and strictly following our internal company 
policies and procedures on issues such as risk management and 
responsible sourcing. Finally, good governance has a wider 
definition in the sense of being a good corporate citizen. This 
means acting appropriately in our position as a major 
multinational organisation and fulfilling the objectives of our 
governance and corporate responsibility agenda.52 
 
Delving deeper into the codes, legal compliance departments make sure to mention 
applicable laws and their consequences to employees--most frequently mentioned 
are Sarbanes Oxley and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act--but in laymen's form. 
There is frequent use of fact patterns in which employees could find themselves, 
                                                
50 McDonald's Standard of Business Conduct for Employees, supra.  
51 Nike, Inc. Compliance, supra.  
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accompanied by the expected behaviour to be in keeping with the regulation in 
question. Arcelor Mittal has an extensive list of situations: competition and antitrust, 
involvement in political activities, trading in the securities of the company, offering 
gifts and entertaining, amongst others. An example follows: 
 
...[If] tickets for a sporting or cultural event are offered to us, the 
person offering the tickets must also plan to attend the event. In 
general, offers of entertainment in the form of meals and drinks 
may be accepted, provided that they are inexpensive, infrequent 
and, as much as possible, reciprocal. As these instructions cannot 
cover every eventuality, we are all required to exercise good 
judgment. The saying «everybody does it» is not a sufficient 
justification. If we are having difficulty deciding whether a 
particular gift or entertainment falls within the boundaries of 
acceptable business practice, we should ask ourselves the 
following questions [questions omitted]...In case of continuing 
doubt, we should consult our Supervisor or the Legal 
Department.53 
 
The most efficient codes of conduct identify issues via a statement of facts, provide 
doctrine that should guide behaviour, and elucidate legal recourses available to 
employees.54 Some corporations go beyond codes of conduct limited to their 
employees, representing an increasingly common expanded role of this compliance 
tool.  It is not atypical for multinational corporations to provide codes of conduct for 
their subsidiaries55 or even local companies simply making up a part of their supply 
chain. The range of entities corporate codes of conduct attempt to loop into its sphere 
reflects compliance departments’ efforts to deflect liability emanating from the 
largest to even the smallest actors. Codes of conduct have thus become the first 
mechanism corporations use to guide corporate strategy and employee behaviour 
with the goal of preventing conduct that could jeopardize their future viability. 
 
 
III Compliance Program Benefits under the US Sentencing Guidelines 
  
                                                
53 Ibid. 
54 Some corporations have subdivided their codes of conduct by job position. 
McDonald's, for example, has a "Director Code of Conduct," a "Financial Officer 
Code of Ethics" and an all encompassing "Standard of Business Conduct". 
55 Nike has subdivided their codes of conduct by company subsidiary: there is a 
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 Should the preventive factor not be strong enough incentive for a corporation 
to create a compliance department, the more tangible factor of mitigation for 
corporate legal violations under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG)56 
represents more than sufficient fodder. As mentioned prior, the legal compliance 
professional must be concerned with keeping internal entities within the parameters 
of the law, but their main responsibility is to ensure, within the legal context, the 
future viability of the entire corporation. Thus while there are a host of statutes 
regulating corporate behaviour, compliance with them must be done in consideration 
of the impact of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines of the United States 
Sentencing Commission.  Otherwise known as the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, these guidelines are used by all US federal courts when sentencing 
corporate criminal cases.57 They represent the consequences that truly affect a 
corporation's fiscal future.  
 The USSG's by-line is that they are not in the game of punishing 
corporations, but simply an entity which seeks to ensure that those damaged by 
corporate misconduct receive just redress. It has four fundamental principles that 
underscore this goal; the first, as previously mentioned, is to promote remedy and 
not punishment, the next three follow. 
(2) If the offending organization is found to exist primarily for a 
criminal purpose or conducts business primarily be criminal 
means, the fine imposed should be large enough to divest the 
corporation of its assets. 
(3) The fine assessed should be based on the seriousness of the 
violation and the culpability of the organization. Culpability is 
determined by a number of factors that the court must consider. 
Two of these factors permit the mitigation of the ultimate 
punishment. These two factors are the existence of an effective 
compliance and ethics program and self-reporting, cooperation, or 
acceptance of responsibility. 
(4) Probation may be appropriate to ensure the implementation of 
another sanction or to reduce the likelihood of future criminal 
conduct. Probation may include a court-implemented and 
supervised compliance program. 58 
 
                                                
56 The Sentencing Guidelines were established as a result of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984, which sought to correct concerns that the existing system of sentencing 
did not adequately provide incentives to deter criminal conduct. From: Banks, supra, 
p. 2-10.  
57 Jeffrey Kaplan and Joseph E. Murphy, Compliance Programs and the Corporate 
Sentencing Guidelines: Preventing Criminal and Civil Liability p. 3-2 (2010).  
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However, the potential severity of the second principle has forced corporations to 
view the Sentencing Guidelines as not just a docile public reconciliation body. Thus, 
solely in the enunciation of its principles, the USSG was immediately able to force 
corporations into realizing the importance and utility of establishing and maintaining 
corporate legal compliance departments. 
 Remedies the USSG has the power to order include corporate "order of 
notices to victims", remedial orders, community service and restitution. Restitution, 
usually monetary and in form of fines, represents the primary concern of 
corporations when faced with legal violations that trigger sentencing. The amount of 
the fine is determined using a multitude of factors that are ultimately scored and 
indexed to a particular dollar value: 
The culpability score is designed to draw distinctions based on 
facts suggesting blameworthiness between the broad range of 
companies that may come before a court for sentencing under the 
sweeping doctrine of vicarious criminal liability: from companies 
that made diligent efforts to prevent offenses, but witnessed an 
employee breach the law nonetheless, to companies whose 
management planned to crime. Convicted organizations start with 
a culpability score of 5 on a scale of 10 points. A court is then 
directed to make factual findings with respect to specified 
aggravating or mitigating factors...which will call upon it to either 
add or subtract to these 5 points.59  
 
The most significant criteria for mitigation include whether: 
 
(1) the organization, prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or 
government investigation, and within a reasonably prompt time 
after becoming aware of the offense, reports the offense to the 
government authorities  
(2) fully cooperated with the investigation 
(3) clearly demonstrates recognition and affirmative acceptance of 
responsibility60 
 
Corporations who have implemented a solid compliance program are eligible for 
significant point reductions from their culpability score which could result in fines 
being reduced by as much as 95%.61  If a corporation does not have an approved 
compliance program in place, there is no flexibility in the culpability score once it 
has been calculated. There has been some argument as to the utility of the USSG, as 
                                                
59 Kaplan and Murphy, supra, p. 3-28. 
60 2011 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Chapter 8 §8C2.5, available at  
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_Guidelines/Manual_HTML/8c2_5.htm. 
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some critics say that it allows corporations to hire professionals able to manipulate 
whether certain profit-making corporate misconduct outweighs the USSG penalty.62 
Were this to be discovered in an investigation however, it would represent an 
undermining of the spirit of a compliance program whose approval is based on 
demonstrated preventative conduct by the compliance department.  
 The United States Sentencing Guidelines have even influenced global 
compliance practice by "accelerating a trend to see 'compliance' as a separate 
subject, with common elements that applied to all legal risk areas."63 Enforcement of 
restitution orders on multinational corporations is becoming more difficult to escape 
as multiple jurisdictions realize the potential benefits of joining forces:  the European 
Union and the United States have conducted joint antitrust compliance investigations 
resulting in collections of $500 million dollars.64 What has made the spread of USSG 
standards so attractive is their basis in "fairly fundamental management principles 
[that make it] a "useful template in any jurisdiction".65 With the growth of 
international entities dedicated to the monitoring, prosecuting and enforcement of 
compliance programs, the establishment of compliance departments is evolving from 
merely a corporate attribute, to a corporate imperative. 
                                                
62 Ilene H Nagel and Winthrop Swenson, Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts 
about Their Future  
71 Wash. U. L. Q. 205, p. 223 (1993).  
63 Kaplan and Murphy, supra, p. 21-7. 
64 Ibid., p. 21-3. 
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 The first chapter elaborated upon general compliance issues that should be of 
concern to all corporations regardless of the environment in which they conduct 
business. This chapter will touch upon two compliance topics that are of 
considerable importance to multinational corporations whose operations span 
multiple jurisdictions and influence several subsidiaries. These topics are Antitrust 
Compliance and the international legal framework against corruption, known as 
Bribery and Corrupt Practices. These topics are important for even those 
corporations not incorporated in the United States or listed on its stock indexes 
because of the aggressive way that the US has decided to pursue violation of conduct 
related to these fields. The "teeth" in US antitrust and corruption legislation has been 
justified by the classic effects doctrine, where "any state may impose liabilities, even 
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has 
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends."66  The United States' 
insistence that corporations comply with its legislation has changed the field of 
compliance in that, where once compliance programs needed to be tailored to the 
local business culture, there is now strong corporate advocacy for standard field-
specific international compliance regimes.  
 Study of the evolution of antitrust compliance is the simplest way to illustrate 
how U.S. legislation has changed the multinational corporate approach to legal 
compliance. Antitrust compliance is "a permanent program of education, prevention 
and detection which aims at guiding the behaviour of a company and all its 
employees in their relations with competitors, suppliers, distributors, clients etc, in 
order to ensure full respect to applicable competition rules and legislation."67 The 
                                                
66 Stanley D Metzger, The Effects Doctrine of Jurisdiction 61 Am. J. Int'l L. 1015, p. 
1015  (1967). 
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first major antitrust legislation came in form of the U.S. Sherman Act68 in 1890, 
which led to a century of the United States acting alone in the creation of a body of 
antitrust case law.  Since the 1980s, there has been an internationalization of antitrust 
law stemming from the view that society benefits from competition, with almost no 
jurisdiction left untouched: 
Like a classic Fourth of July fireworks show, the global antitrust 
spectacular--the first or global proliferation phase of it, anyway--
may end with a thunderous display. When the last echo of the 
climactic "silver salutes" in China and India have faded, every 
major economy on Earth will have an antitrust statute of general 
applicability to business conduct and transactions. When that 
occurs, jurisdictions with antitrust laws will account for over 95 
percent of world GDP. Take the OPEC nations out of the 
calculation and the figure is closer to 99 percent.69  
 
This trend toward international antitrust law is reflected most prominently in the rise 
of international organizations dedicated to the topic. The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has a Competition Committee that "has been 
active in promoting multilateral cooperation among the numerous competition 
authorities of the developed world and, through a targeted outreach program, those 
in the developing world as well."70 The United Nations' Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts on Competition Law and Policy has dedicated itself to offering antitrust 
technical assistance to developing jurisdictions and peer-reviewing antitrust agencies 
worldwide.71 In 2001, an assembly of 13 competition agencies formed the 
International Competition Network (ICN) that is now revered as the authority on 
international antitrust law and the guardian of its global standards. There is now no 
                                                
68 "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic 
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It 
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield 
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality 
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment 
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But 
even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the 
Act is competition." From: Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,  4-
5 (1958).    
69 Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Managing Antitrust Compliance Through the Continuing 
Surge in Global Enforcement, 75 Antitrust L.J. 965, p. 979 (2009).  
70 Ibid., p. 988. 
71 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Group of Experts on 
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question that what was an American legal eccentricity, is now a universally accepted 
standard. However, international antitrust laws "cannot have their desired impact 
without international standards and efforts for compliance."72 
 Paralleling conclusions reached prior, the benefits of having a corporate 
antitrust compliance program drastically outweigh the implementation costs 
multinational corporations often bemoan. Of primary concern to corporations are the 
fines: criminal antitrust fines obtained by the US Antitrust Division are set to exceed 
$3 billion for the period 2000 through 2008.73 Moreover, antitrust violations can 
leave corporations subject to a host of expensive "procedural devices and remedial 
incentives" such as minimal civil pleading requirements ("notice pleading"), broad 
discovery rules (including extensive pre-trial discovery), class action procedures 
(especially the "opt-out" variety), plaintiff-friendly rules for proof of damages 
(permitting any estimation methodology short of "mere speculation") , joint and 
several liability for damages among co-conspirators (without right of contribution or 
claim reduction), and mandatory award of attorney's fees against losing defendants 
but no such award--mandatory or discretionary--against losing plaintiffs.74 The 
severity of antitrust violations is not unique to only the United States as countries 
worldwide have upped their antitrust penalties; in Brazil alone, there are more than 
150 on-going cartel investigations and of 200 executives facing antirust charges in 
2011, 40 were convicted and sentenced 5-year prison terms. 75 If one looks to the 
European Union (EU), one discovers that in 2011 it almost matched the United 
States in antitrust violation fine assessments.76 Worse still for multinational 
corporations is the growth of stronger relationships between antitrust governing 
authorities worldwide who are working together to aid antitrust prosecution 
proceedings in different jurisdictions.  
 Worldwide antitrust agencies have been energized by the mega-resource that 
is their combined intelligence, investigatory, and prosecutorial arm. The first layer of 
international coordination is the addition of antitrust violations to existing Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaties that require the participating states to consult (i.e. ease 
                                                
72 Ted Banks and Joe Murphy, The International Law of Antitrust Compliance, 40 
Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 373, p. 373 (2011).  
73 Lipsky, Jr., supra, p. 978.  
74 Ibid.  
75 Calliari, supra. 
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discovery process, extradite offenders) each other when entities within their 
jurisdictions incur antitrust charges.77 A fruit of such treaties is the use of the 
Interpol "Red Notice" list for U.S. antitrust offenders: this international wanted list 
has resulted in the arrest and service of prison terms by defendants from a variety of 
countries.78 It is now not uncommon for several countries to conduct "dawn raids"79 
(i.e. an unannounced information gathering effort) to benefit antitrust prosecution in 
multiple jurisdictions:  
When dawn raids were conducted on Valentine's Day 2003 in 
connection with the so-called plastics modifiers case, for 
example, Canada, the European Union (acting in conjunction with 
local authorities in its Member States including Belgium, the 
Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom), 
Japan, and the United States all coordinated their activities and 
launched raids all over the world within a narrow time window.80 
 
However, international efforts by antitrust agencies have not just focused on capture 
and prosecution. Again, following a hallmark of the U.S. antitrust legal framework, 
international antitrust agencies are implementing leniency programs that should be 
born in mind when corporations develop their antitrust compliance programs. 
Similar to how the USSG calculates "culpability scores" whose mitigation is 
dependent upon a corporation's implementation of an effective compliance program, 
leniency programs incentivize self-reporting by corporations who have participated 
in cartels. The maximum benefits of such programs are available to corporations 
who take the lead in admitting their antitrust violations: 
Typically, leniency is available only if an applicant is, inter alia, 
a) the first company to approach the authority about the cartel; b) 
is not the ringleader of the cartel; c) takes steps to terminate its 
                                                
77 Julian M. Joshua et al., Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Cartel 
Enforcement's Global Reach, 75 Antitrust L.J. 353, p. 360 (2008). 
78 Ibid., p. 361. 
79 Defined as unannounced inspections in order to preserve the element of surprise 
and thereby maximize the evidentiary output of common investigative efforts. In 
Europe, competition authorities conducting "dawn raids" often specifically seek out 
written legal advice rendered by in-house antitrust counsel, and this legal advice 
ultimately may be treated as evidence, without regard to any assertion of legal 
privilege. This is because the European Union does not recognize attorney-client 
privilege with respect to communications by or with in-house counsel. 
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involvement in the cartel; and d) provides full cooperation with 
the authorities in the investigation of the cartel.81 
 
Leniency programs represent an alternative to prosecution that still capitalizes on 
joint international efforts and moreover, eases antitrust agencies' burden of 
constantly being "on alert" for signs of potential corporate violations.  
 In order to take advantage of leniency programs the establishment of an 
antitrust compliance program is essential and many organizations have recently 
published detailed manuals as to how corporations can best launch one. On a general 
level, antitrust compliance programs should focus on adequately training employees 
to recognize potential cartels, educating them about the importance of prompt and 
accurate reporting, and providing the requisite infrastructure for the company to 
investigate and decide options for leniency depending on the jurisdiction.82 
 The US Department of Justice (US DOJ) is a good starting point; it has 
developed a web page—Compliance Assistance Resources for Businesses—that 
aggregates antitrust statutory provisions, guidelines and policy statements, and links 
to useful external sources.83 The U.S. Green Building Council has provided a 
template, based on their own antitrust compliance program, that can easily be 
retooled by smaller multinational corporations that don't have the resources to 
develop one from scratch.84 The most comprehensive set of recommendations for 
corporate antitrust compliance best-practice was recently published by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in their April 2013 "ICC Antitrust 
Compliance Toolkit."   
 Unlike the majority of compliance program resources, there is no discussion 
of the antitrust legal framework but instead an emphasis is put on the practical steps 
corporations can take to institute an antitrust compliance program. The ICC appears 
                                                
81 American Bar Association, Antitrust Compliance: Perspectives and Resources for 
Corporate Counsel, "Special Issues in Planning for Global Antitrust and Competition 
Law Compliance"  
p. 161 (2005).  
82 American Bar Association, supra, p. 162. 
83 United States Department of Justice, Compliance Assistance Resources for 
Businesses, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/business-resources.html. 
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especially proud of the fact that the Toolkit was "designed by business for 
business,85" again emphasizing the practicality of the document:  
The toolkit is designed by business for business and reflects 
contributions from antitrust specialists closely associated with in-
house compliance efforts around the world. It is hoped that it will 
assist companies from all sectors and of all sizes, including small- 
and medium-sized companies (SMEs) to establish an antitrust 
compliance programme suited to their needs, risk profile and 
resources.86 
 
The Toolkit is divided into 11 chapters that follow the first introduction of a 
compliance program into a corporation, to the ways in which the program can be 
improved into perpetuity: 
1. Compliance embedded as company culture and policy 
2. Compliance organization and resources 
3. Risk identification and assessment 
4. Antitrust compliance know-how 
5. Antitrust concerns-handling systems 
6. Handling of internal investigations 
7. Disciplinary actions  
8. Antitrust due diligence 
9. Antitrust compliance certification 
10. Compliance incentives 
11. Monitoring and continuous improvement87 
 
While the ICC has highlighted the non-legal nature of the Toolkit, what is most 
notable is the people-centred approach characteristic to the document. There is a call 
for someone within a corporation to take ownership of the compliance effort and 
ultimately lead a compliance "cultural renaissance " within the organization.88 The 
ICC Toolkit, perhaps unwittingly, made the most practical observation of all: legal 
knowledge and internal changes in corporate operations (i.e. effective compliance 





                                                
85 International Chamber of Commerce, The ICC Antitrust Compliance Toolkit p. 5 
(2013). 
86 Caroline Inthavisay, ICC unveils Antitrust Compliance Toolkit available at:  
http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2013/ICC-unveils-Antitrust-Compliance-
Toolkit/. 
87 International Chamber of Commerce, supra, p.13. 
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 Instilling at least of modicum of ethical behaviour into corporate conduct is 
the subject of Bribery and Corrupt Practices (B&CP) legislation that has taken hold 
the world over. There is recognition that "engaging in corrupt practices...creates a 
very unfavourable business environment by encouraging unfair advantage and anti-
competitive practices."89 Evidence abounds: the World Bank estimates that 0.5 
percent of GDP is lost through corruption each year, studies underscore its corrosive 
effect on the rule of law and trust in public institutions, and it is one of the primary 
obstacles to the economic development of a country.90 These incontestable facts 
have led to a standardization of the legal framework governing B&CP, in the same 
vein as the antitrust regime, with the United States again having drafted the seminal 
statute. Hampering the logical next step, the standardization of the compliance 
regimen, is the "local culture" factor that makes it difficult to discern whether certain 
corporate conduct falls within the sphere of benign business etiquette or should be 
interpreted as an actual corrupt practice. B&CP compliance highlights the difficulties 
multinationals face when the normative framework is in place, but the compliance 
framework cannot be equally fixed due to variances in local business cultures.  
 The first Bribery and Corrupt Practices statute was the U.S. Foreign and 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) which was the sole legislation of its kind for 
almost thirty years. One of the more extensively worded statutes, it applies to a host 
of natural and juridical persons91 with the objective of preventing them from making 
a payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. For 
our purposes92, it is best to distil the elements necessary for a conviction under the 
FCPA into a few short words: 
In the prosecution...for a violation of the FCPA...a Virginia 
district court case indicated that in order to obtain a criminal 
                                                
89 Brian P. Loughman and Richard A. Sibery, Bribery and Corruption: Navigating 
the Global Risks p.3 (2011).   
90 Ibid. 
91 Defined as (A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United 
States; and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, 
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its 
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws 
of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the 
United States. From: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. §78). 
92 In addition to the anti-bribery provision, there is an accounting provision that 
requires persons subject to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to make and keep detailed 
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conviction under the FCPA, the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is a 
1) domestic concern, corporate issuer, individual, firm, officer, 
director, employee, agent/stockholder of a firm; 
2) that made use of a means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce; 
3) corruptly; 
4) in furtherance of a offer or payment of anything of value to any 
person; 
5) while knowing that the money or item of value would be 
offered or given directly or indirectly to any foreign official; and  
6) for purposes of influencing any act or decision of such foreign 
official in his or her official capacity.93 
 
There are few exceptions to the statute, but the most prominent is that persons are 
allowed conduct that facilitates routine government action: 
 
“[FCPA] shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting payment 
to a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of 
which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine 
governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party 
official.”94 
 
The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 outdoes the FCPA in that it maintains all of the prior 
provisions and extends some further: 
"[The U.K. Bribery Act] covers all bribery, both commercial and 
public officials; makes no exceptions for facilitation payments 
made to expedite routine governmental actions; makes it a 
corporate offense to fail to prevent bribery; makes it an offense 
not only to give but also receive a bribe."95 
 
Both statutes are accompanied by sentencing guidelines similar to those discussed 
previously—corporate prison terms and hefty fine assessments—that corporations all 
but ignored due to the flagrant lack of enforcement of either statute.  The early 2000s 
brought a reversal that required corporations to incorporate B&CP laws into 
compliance programs because of the eruption of enforcement efforts by U.S. and 
British authorities. Initially, the authorities96 gave corporations warnings that still 
went unheeded until actual charges were brought upon them. At a 2010 FCPA 
conference, a US DOJ official spoke of  "a “new era” of FCPA enforcement and 
                                                
93 Loughman and Sibery, supra, p.15. 
94 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. §78). 
95 Loughman and Sibery, supra, p. 30. 
96 In the United States, B&CP violations are handled by the US Department of 
Justice (US DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); in the U.K., 
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warned that those worried about more aggressive anti-bribery enforcement “are right 
to be more concerned.”"97 In 2011, the director of the UK's SFO reiterated this 
enforcement trend: 
"I have made it clear that the new extended jurisdiction in respect 
of foreign corporates is very important to the SFO. This creates a 
level playing field and enables us to support ethical U.K. 
corporates who have been undermined by foreign corporates who 
use bribery to obtain a business advantage...We intend to adopt an 
aggressive interpretation of the Act's jurisdictional reach."98 
 
 Soon the numbers began to correspond with the warnings as FCPA enforcement 
actions went from a few in 2004 to over 70 in 2010.99 Consequently, corporations 
again looked to international legal authorities for guidance on what constituted 
B&CP and what proactive measures could be taken to avoid violations.   
 Certain types of corporate misconduct can be conclusively revealed by 
referring to statutes, while other types must take into account "messy" factors such as 
mens rea or in the case of B&CP, local business culture. The standardization of 
antitrust compliance was aided by the near universal implementation of detailed laws 
prohibiting anticompetitive conduct and defining what that consisted of in minutiae. 
Ethics and culture are not universally consistent and thus difficult to factor into a 
universally applicable legal framework, let alone a compliance program. While the 
antitrust compliance literature published by international agencies such as the United 
Nations (UN) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) celebrated the 
"technical," "practical," and "implementable" attributes of their work, the B&CP 
compliance sector must sort through a series of principles devoid of suggestions for a 
unified B&CP compliance program. There is also a distinct lack of resources aimed 
specifically at corporations, with most B&CP material directed at states. In a 1997 
resolution, the Council of Europe issued The Twenty Guiding Principles for the 
Fight Against Corruption which included such vague guidelines as "ensur[e] the 
independence and autonomy of those fighting corruption."100 Similar vagaries are 
found in the 2006 African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
                                                
97 Loughman and Sibery, supra, p. 5. 
98 Ibid., p. 30. 
99 Ibid., p. 5. 
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ratified by a majority of African nations.101 The Organization of American States has 
issued several resolutions on the topic, most notably the Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption but is characterized by its attention to reactive rather than 
preventive measures important for compliance departments. Even the United Nations 
had difficulty framing prescriptive policies against corruption "as action...was 
overshadowed by the antagonism [over definitions of corruption] between the 
northern and southern blocks."102 The business-friendly OECD however, not only 
drafted the OECD Convention on Bribery but made influential recommendations that 
directly affected the way corporations conducted business in light of B&CP 
legislation: 
The 2009 Recommendation of the Council on Tax Measures for 
Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions...succeeds the 1996 
Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes 
to Foreign Public Officials. As indicated earlier, the issue of tax 
deductibility of transnational bribes undermines fair competition in 
international markets. While American corporations, due to the 
existence of the FCPA, could not partake in bribery in their 
business dealings abroad, European corporations could not only do 
so legally (as it was not criminalized in their countries), but could 
also claim tax deduction in their countries for the expenses 
incurred when bribing foreign officials.103  
 
Shortly after the release of these recommendations, the OECD Member States104 
who had allowed these deductions, and thus encouraged corporate corruption via 
their fiscal subsidies of the practice, effectively closed this tax loophole.105 What can 
be concluded is that while there is a lack of resources dedicated to practicable 
measures for B&CP compliance, there has been at least an effort to create a global 
legal environment that is hostile to the practice.  
 However, the local business culture is a factor that directly affects how 
hostile a particular jurisdiction is to BC&P and what kind of compliance programs 
                                                
101 Jon Jordan, The Need for a Comprehensive International Foreign Bribery 
Compliance Program, Converting A to Z, in an Expanding Global Anti-Bribery 
Environment, 117 Penn St. L. Rev.89, p. 102 (2012). 
102 Terracino, supra, p. 57.  
103 Ibid., p. 65. 
104 Surprisingly, the list of countries that allowed tax deductibility are very 
prominent members of the global marketplace: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  
105 Mark Pieth, Lucinda A. Low et al., The OECD Convention on Bribery: A 
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can be most effectively implemented. If one examines the B&CP legislation in China 
for example, it will reveal that it is in line with the international legal standards 
discussed above:  
"China's legislation on commercial bribery prohibits the use of 
money, goods, or other means to bribe a commercial unit or its 
individual for the purpose of selling or purchasing commodities. 
The term "other means" includes the providing of tours and visits 
inside or outside China under the pretext of travel or study. The 
legislation also considers offering secret off-the-books rebates as 
the offering of a commercial bribe."106 
 
However, multinational corporate compliance departments have found it difficult to 
communicate the idea of "kickback" to Chinese employees because of the fifteen 
different definitions of the term in Chinese, none of which imply illegality.107 
Furthermore, business dealings in China are notorious for requiring expenditures on, 
"at a minimum...large banquet-like celebrations, attended by hundreds of individuals, 
complete with the exchange of gifts."108 These anecdotes hopefully illuminate to 
what degree cultural considerations must be considered in the development of a 
B&CP compliance program and why patchwork, instead of universal, compliance 
programs appear to be the norm within the B&CP sector. As the prominence of 
Asian corporations rises and the West continues to have difficulties grasping the 
cultural nuances of its business culture, Asian organizations are beginning to develop 
B&CP compliance mechanisms unique to their business landscape. The Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), in association with the OECD, has developed an action 
plan entitled the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific that has set 
out standards and practical "sustainable safeguards against corruption in the 
economic, political and social spheres of the countries in the region...".109 This idea 
of B&CP compliance specialization has still not overcome the predominating call for 
effective compliance procedures in an international anti-bribery environment, it 
                                                
106 Kaplan and Murphy, Compliance and Ethics Program in China, supra, p. 21A-19. 
107 Travis P. Nelson and Frank C. Razzano, The expanding criminalization of 
transnational bribery: global prosecution necessitates global compliance, 42 Int'l 
Law. 1259, p. 1283 (2008). 
108 Mike Koehler, The unique FCPA compliance challenges of doing business in 
China,  
 25 Wis. Int'l L.J. 397, p. 417 (2007). 
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being that regardless of local business culture, multinationals are still vulnerable to 
B&CP legislation from places beyond their immediate consideration.  
 As indicated by the prior statistics, multinational corporations have only met 
serious legal problems under the FCPA, rendering compliance with it the de facto 
international B&CP standard. A useful starting point for compliance departments 
would be to "get inside the mind" of the FCPA enforcement authorities, a task that 
has been facilitated by a Deloitte report on a 2012 US DOJ/SEC FCPA guide 
entitled the New FCPA Resource Guide: Ten Things for Legal and Compliance 
Officers to Consider.  This guide aids companies by highlighting the specific 
conduct that compliance departments should focus upon in their compliance 
initiatives. A selection of the most telling follows:  
1. The most critical way to defend against FCPA exposure is a 
preexisting compliance program that is risk-tailored and risk-
based. 
2. In the eyes of a regulator, the tone at the middle and tone at the 
bottom of a company will define the effectiveness of the tone at 
the top. 
3. FCPA compliance is the responsibility of a senior executive 
who must work to ensure adequate staffing and resources. 
6. Even non-controlled affiliates, joint ventures, distributors, and 
dealers should be included in the risk assessment and compliance 
plan. 
8. The ultimate test for an FCPA compliance program is "Does it 
work?" Companies must be prepared to prove that it does.110 
 
The report also emphasized that compliance departments do their due diligence for 
their particular industry by noting what US DOJ/SEC authorities consider "red flags" 
when selecting a company to investigate.111 Some of the more important "red flags" 
                                                
110Robert T. Biskup et al., Deloitte's New FCPA Resource Guide: Ten things for 
legal and compliance officers to consider p.3 (2012). Available at: 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Del
oitteForensicCenter/us_dfc_new_fcpa_resource_guide_screen-friendly_012413.pdf. 
111 This is especially true as the FCPA has a history of dedicating special scrutiny to 
particular industries: in the past decade, defence, oil & gas, and pharmaceuticals 
have been prime targets. Lately, this scrutiny has been shifted to the financial sector 
(i.e. banks and brokerage firms) as the formerly targeted industries "have responded 
to the well-publicized deficiencies in their programs with reforms and increased 
emphasis on clearly written programs and policies coupled with aggressive and 
comprehensive training." Enforcement eyes increasingly are trained on new business 
sectors that operate in corrupt markets that have not felt the pressure to attend to 
their FCPA or anti-bribery compliance operations. From: Robertson Park and 
Timothy P. Peterson, Regulatory: Federal agencies target new industries for FCPA 
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involve the local business culture, as a country's rank on Transparency International's 
Corruption Perception Index can "assist attorneys in evaluating perceived FCPA 
risks for a potential transaction.112 Beyond a simple country assessment, compliance 
departments should look at the nature of the business in the countries in which the 
corporation operates because certain business structures attract more US DOJ/SEC 
attention: heavy use of "agents, distributors or other dealers" and reliance on 
"consultants and other third parties" may "signify an increased opportunity for 
corruption since these third parties are outside of the target's direct control."113 Last, 
a corporation's intended clients are as important as the agents they use to conduct 
business: 
If the target has government or government-owned customers or 
otherwise substantially interacts with government officials, the 
risk of an FCPA violation may be high. Additionally, if the 
target's business requires government licenses or approvals, or 
interaction with customs, police, or military officials, the FCPA 
risk may be significant.114 
 
Having a sound understanding of these red flags and how authorities interpret certain 
corporate operations will aid compliance departments in the implementation of 
effective compliance mechanisms. 
 Implementable mechanisms for an effective B&CP compliance program 
under the FCPA standard are extensive, purposefully methodical, and intended to 
create a large body of evidence supporting good corporate conduct. The simplest 
mechanism is the utilization of "check the box" type procedures for corporate 
employees, such as certification requirements that check for understanding of FCPA 
policy and awareness of violations by any company personnel.115 Of a more binding 
nature is compliance department evaluation of company contracts, an instrument 
usually under exclusive control of the legal department:  
As discussed earlier, due diligence should be performed with 
respect to 
                                                
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/06/12/regulatory-federal-agencies-target-new-
industries. 
112 Martin J. Weinstein, The world of international compliance: what transactional 
lawyers need to know to perform ethically and responsibly, 29 Hous. J. Int'l L. 311, 
p. 322 (2006). 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid.  
115 Daniel L. Goelzer, Designing an FCPA compliance program: minimizing the 
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foreign agents, and such persons may be required to execute 
contracts obligating 
them to comply with FCPA and company policies concerning 
payments 
to foreign officials. Files should be maintained documenting 
compliance with these requirements with respect to each foreign 
agent or 
other person covered by the policy that is retained, and these files 
should be 
reviewed periodically for completeness and conformity to the 
policy.116 
Another idea would be to change the focus of traditional compliance measures, such 
as monitoring, from being quantitative in nature (i.e. number of transactions, amount 
of monetary exchanges) to more qualitative in nature by paying closer attention to 
supporting documentation and written reports of these quantitative transactions.117 A 
compliance mechanism that is becoming more common is to do actual face-to-face 
interviews with employees in FCPA-vulnerable areas within the corporation's ambit:  
Periodic visits to foreign operations by internal auditors or staff 
members 
with compliance responsibilities may include interviews with 
local 
personnel during which such personnel are questioned concerning 
the existence 
of any circumstances suggesting FCPA violations.  
 
The combined use of these compliance mechanisms are powerful in negating B&CP 
violations that are being aggressively enforced on the world stage by the US DOJ 
and the UK SFO.  The difficulty for corporations lies in the establishment of an 
effective B&CP compliance program that can be translatable to different business 
environments where local practice can substantially stray from the de facto global 
standards.   
 
 While antitrust compliance has seen a global normalization of laws that led to 
its compliance programs following in the same vein, Bribery & Corrupt Practices 
laws did not have a similar trajectory. This contrast highlights the fact that while 
multinational corporations may be aware of the international compliance issues 
facing them, it is not enough to assume that they can be addressed formulaically as 
"international issues." Compliance regimes on the international level are subject to 
the same frailties of classic international law: cultural receptivity and interpretation. 
                                                
116 Ibid., p. 301. 















 The previous chapters discuss legal compliance issues that are applicable to a 
multitude of corporations operating in an international setting—for example, 
technology, telecommunication, and pharmaceutical corporations must all give 
ample consideration to the prior compliance discussion. To fully illustrate how legal 
compliance works within a company from "start to finish", it is useful to elect a 
particular sector, a particular set of laws and its corresponding compliance program. 
This chapter follows the complete trajectory of a legal compliance regimen in the 
multinational banking sector, specifically in regards to anti-money laundering 
compliance (henceforth, "AML Compliance"). The rapidly expanding world of AML 
Compliance clearly illuminates the complexity of internationally oriented 
compliance regimes because of its host of interplaying stakeholders (clients, banks, 
governments), the involvement of both the legal and black market, and the 
jurisdictional variance in legal ramifications for being connected to laundered 
capital.  After a short introduction on the subject of money laundering, the details of 
how multinational banks implement an effective AML compliance program118 will 
ultimately serve as a representative example of a corporate legal compliance 
initiative.  
Background on money laundering 
 The concept of money laundering is rooted in organized crime and its 
amassment of large amounts of capital from activities involving violence, 
intimidation, corruption, large-scale theft and drug trafficking.119 Due to the size of 
these illegally-made profits, organized crime needed to establish a mechanism to 
divert attention from the origin of their bounty: in the 1920s, as the first such 
mechanism, American criminal organizations operated cash-intensive laundromats to 
                                                
118 While elements of an effective compliance program have been discussed in 
previous chapters, it is useful to have them distilled into the following seven steps: 
(1) Leadership, accountability, structure (2) Written standards (3) Education and 
Training (4) Auditing and Monitoring (5) Reporting (6) Enforcement and Discipline 
(7) Response and Prevention,  
From: Merck, Compliance: Being an ethical company is about much more than 
simply adhering to the letter of the law—but that’s an important step, Available at: 
http://www.merckresponsibility.com/focus-areas/ethics-transparency/compliance/. 
119 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model 
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legitimize funds, a fact that explains the etymology of money laundering.120 For 
decades, money laundering was closely associated to organized crime but its scope 
has widened to include tax evaders and most recently, terrorists. What all parties 
have in common is a desire to transform or conceal assets121 that were knowingly 
derived from illegal activities (or other related offenses) for their personal use. 
 Money laundering has understandably become more sophisticated since the 
era of laundromat schemes and can be effectuated using a range of techniques. The 
most common follow:  
-Investing the dirty money in legitimate businesses, either through 
shell companies or through genuine companies using 
pseudonyms. 
-Where the launderer acquires assets from the proceeds of crimes. 
-Depositing of money in banks in non-cooperative countries and 
remittances through banking channels in the host country 
-Use of non-banking channels to transfer money (such as hawala 
and hundi) 
-Over-invoicing of goods in seemingly normal business 
transactions. 
-Routing money through tax haven countries--the Cayman Islands 
and other Caribbean territories have been very prominent in this 
respect.122 
 
In light of these common techniques, money-laundering experts have created a three-
part framework outlining the general route of illegal assets: placement, layering and 
integration. Placement involves the physical disposal of funds into the financial 
system. Layering is the attempt to create layers of financial transactions to distance 
and disguise the funds from their criminal sources. Integration, the final stage, is the 
reintroduction of funds into the economy in such a way that it looks to be derived 
from a legitimate source. Through this series of financial distortions, crime literally 
"pays off" for money launderers.  
 Preventing criminals from amassing money is not the only motivation for 
AML policy makers; money laundering has less obvious, but still significant, 
                                                
120 Norman Mugarura. The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in 
Less Developed Countries p. 2 (2012). 
121 Assets covered by anti-money laundering legislation are not limited to 
transactions involving coin or paper money. A range of assets are touched by the 
law: traveller’s checks, cashier's checks, money orders, promissory notes, securities 
in bearer form and other "monetary instruments." Proceeds derived from transactions 
involving the prior list of assets are also within the scope of AML provisions. From:  
Wolters Kluwer Federal Money Laundering Regulation: Banking, Securities, and 
Compliance (2013).  
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impacts on society in general. In distorting the amount of money circulating within 
the economy, political institutions cannot make accurate economic policy for their 
nations.123 "Money laundering leads to volatility in exchange rates and interest rates 
due to unanticipated inflows and outflows of capital."124 For financial institutions, 
specifically banks, large amounts of laundered funds can impact solvability and 
liquidity, hence compromising bank soundness.125 It is the threat money laundering 
poses to stable economic growth, legitimate business operations and sound financial 
institutions that propels the attention given to it within legal frameworks worldwide.  
 
Effective AML Compliance Program 
 The first step to the implementation of any compliance program is 
compliance officer familiarity with the relevant legal framework for their sector. 
Three basic laws and regulations govern the AML legal framework: the Money 
Laundering Control Act, the Bank Secrecy Act, and the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, Specially Designated Nationals List. There are both criminal and regulatory 
provisions, the latter of which is of primary concern to compliance departments as 
they outline the preventive measures financial institutions are obligated to put into 
place under the law.  
 The criminal arm of the AML legal framework is the Money Laundering 
Control Act of 1986 (18 USC 1956). "It prohibits a person from engaging in a 
financial transaction with the proceeds of 'specified unlawful activity' with the intent 
to promote the carrying on of that activity or with knowledge that the transaction is 
designed to conceal or disguise the proceeds or circumvent reporting 
requirements."126 Furthermore, it is an all encompassing statute, making it unlawful 
for a person to engage in a monetary transaction that he or she knows even merely 
"involves" criminally derived property.127 Just as large as what entails illegal conduct 
is the category of persons the statute is applicable to: the Money Laundering Control 
Act applies to all persons and businesses in the United States and parallel entities 
                                                
123 Dr. Brigitte Unger et al., The Amounts and the Effects of Money Laundering, p. 
91 (2006).  
124 Ibid., p. 89. 
125 Ibid., p. 91. 
126 Wolters Kluwer, supra, p. 17. 
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outside US borders should part of illegal transactions take place in American 
territory. The wording of the statute is deceptively simple:  
If a person or business... 
(1) knows money or property comes from 
(2) some illegal activity, and the person or business 
(3) engages in a transaction with it, then  
(4) that person or business is a money launderer128 
 
Compliance departments must go further into the meaning of the statute by looking 
at how it has been interpreted by the U.S. court system.  For example, courts have 
interpreted "knows" to include wilful blindness, where an offender has ignored 
certain red flags that indicate money came from an illegal source.129 Another 
example involves the term "some", which courts have consistently interpreted as 
"any" criminal activity, even if an offender does not know what that activity is.130 
The number and range of monetary transactions that banks enter into put them at risk 
for criminal charges under the above statute, but this risk can be averted if the 
regulatory arm of the AML legal framework is duly respected.  
 "A regime, whose objective is to combat money laundering, must, by 
necessity, weaken the right to financial privacy."131 To ensure the practical 
implementation of the Money Laundering Control Act, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) 
requires banks and other financial institutions132 to retain records and file reports 
concerning certain financial transactions133, including, those surpassing $10,000 
                                                
128 The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (USA), 18 USC § 1956. 
129 Greg Baldwin, AML Compliance Officer Training, Slide 27 (2008). 
130 Ibid. 
131 Bruce Zagaris and Sheila M. Castilla, Constructing an International Financial 
Enforcement Subregime: The Implementation of Anti-Money-Laundering Policy, 19 
Brook. J. Int'l L. 871, p. 909 (1993). 
132 There are 24 entities that constitute financial institutions apart from banks; they 
include mutual funds, insurance companies and even dealers in precious stones, 
metals or jewels.  
From: US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 31, Money and Finance: Financial 
Record Keeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions (31 CFR 
103.140). 
133 There is a copious list of transactions compliance departments must monitor other 
than inflows/outflows of capital. There are compliance obligations related to the 
following financial services: financial leasing, money transmission services, 
issuing/administering means of payment (e.g. credit cards, travellers' checks and 
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and/or those involving cross-border transportation of an equal amount.134 Relevant to 
banking compliance departments are the five regulatory requirements included in 
this act. These include (1) a written AML program (2) procedures in place to "Know 
Your Customer" (3) holding periodic employee training and audits (4) training to 
identify and react to suspicious activity and (5) checking the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals List. 135 Note that the five 
requirements follow the general elements of an effective compliance program 
prescribed by experts, as per Footnote 118.  
 The second provision of the regulatory requirements— the "know your 
customer principle" (KYC)— is the most fundamental to AML compliance 
procedures. The KYC obligation should not be viewed as a mere bureaucratic 
requirement, but rather as an important means to identifying activity that could lead 
to a bank being suspected of involvement in money laundering. KYC compliance 
procedures are investigatory in nature and meant to establish a customer's identity 
and his corresponding means of earning income. These procedures arise in three 
broad circumstances: 
(1) Where a customer will become a regular or habitual client and 
the service provided will not be a "one off." The most obvious 
example is that of the person who wants to open a bank account. 
In all such cases, the onus will be on the bank to establish the 
identity of the person for whom it proposes to provide banking 
services.  
(2) Where there is reason to believe, or where it is known, that the 
customer is not acting on his own behalf, then "reasonable 
measures" must be taken to establish the identity of the third party 
for whom that person is acting. 
(3) Where a bank provides service of a kind mentioned in 
[Footnote 134]136 
 
Under each of these circumstances, there are separate steps that prescribe what kind 
of documentation is acceptable for verification, describe non-documentary methods 
for verifying identification, and guide compliance officers in those situations where 
verification cannot be accomplished.137  Above, it was noted that checking the Office 
                                                
foreign exchange, financial futures and options, transferable securities), money 
broking, portfolio management and advice amongst others.  
From: Michael Ashe and Paula Reid, Money Laundering: Risks and Liabilities, 
"Compliance" p.57 (2006).  
134 The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (USA), 31 USC § 5311–5330. 
135 Known colloquially as the "terrorist list." 
136 Ashe and Reid, supra, p. 61. 
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of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals List constituted an 
independent provision under the BSA, but it is a critical first step in the KYC 
process. The SDN List names the people and entities that are prohibited from 
transferring assets without OFAC authorization.138 A more helpful list to compliance 
departments is the OFAC "Grey List" that contains the names of people or entities 
that may be put on the SDN List in the future and thus alerts banks to potential 
problem areas or customers.139 Neglecting to check these frequently updated lists can 
put financial institutions at risk for civil penalties of up to $100,000 and criminal 
penalties that could include 10-year prison terms.140  
 Provisions three and four of the BSA regulatory requirements can be 
combined under the category of employee training. A core part of the duties of a 
compliance department is to ensure that all members of the organization understand 
their duties under the laws pertaining to their industry. Moreover, the AML 
Compliance team itself should also undergo periodic scrutiny and retraining as 
necessary via the use of independent auditors. For AML compliance, the most 
important training program is that designed to arm compliance employees with the 
skills needed to identify "suspicious activity" amongst a financial institution's client 
base. To qualify as "suspicious activity" a transaction must show signs of a violation 
of a federal law or regulation, signs of terrorist financing, or one that appears to have 
no legitimate or reasonable business purpose.141 Many government agencies have 
compiled lists of "red flags" to which banks can refer in order to determine 
potentially suspicious activity. These lists consists of hundreds of "red flags," what 
follows is a selection from the principal "suspicious activities" headings:  
 
Customers Who Provide Insufficient or Suspicious 
Information 
• A customer uses unusual or suspicious identification documents 
that cannot be readily verified. 
• A customer provides an individual tax identification number after 
having previously used a Social Security number. 
                                                
138 Matthew H. Wenig, Exporting U.S. Products, Services and Technologies: An 
Overview of the Regulations and Considerations Regarding Compliance Programs, 
23 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 569, p. 577 (1995). 
139 Ibid., p. 578. 
140 Baldwin, supra, Slide 54. 
141 Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering InfoBase, Appendix F: Money 
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• A customer uses different tax identification numbers with 
variations of his or her name. 
Efforts to Avoid Reporting or Recordkeeping Requirement 
• A customer or group tries to persuade a bank employee not to file 
required reports or maintain required records. 
• A customer is reluctant to provide information needed to file a 
mandatory report, to have the report filed, or to proceed with a 
transaction after being informed that the report must be filed. 
• A customer is reluctant to furnish identification when purchasing 
negotiable instruments in recordable amounts. 
• A business or customer asks to be exempted from reporting or 
recordkeeping requirements. 
Funds Transfers 
• Many funds transfers are sent in large, round dollar, hundred 
dollar, or thousand dollar amounts. 
• Funds transfer activity occurs to or from a financial secrecy 
haven, or to or from a higher-risk geographic location without an 
apparent business reason or when the activity is inconsistent with 
the customer’s business or history. 
• Many small, incoming transfers of funds are received, or deposits 
are made using checks and money orders. Almost immediately, 
all or most of the transfers or deposits are wired to another city or 
country in a manner inconsistent with the customer’s business or 
history. 
Activity Inconsistent with the Customer’s Business 
• The currency transaction patterns of a business show a sudden 
change inconsistent with normal activities. 
• A large volume of cashier’s checks, money orders, or funds 
transfers is deposited into, or purchased through, an account when 
the nature of the accountholder’s business would not appear to 
justify such activity. 
• A retail business has dramatically different patterns of currency 
deposits from similar businesses in the same general location.142 
 
AML Compliance officers must be trained to recognize the increasingly 
sophisticated manifestations of the above signs of money laundering.  The Internet 
age has ushered in new complications for AML Compliance as money-laundering 
offenders take advantage of "identity masking features" that make it more difficult to 
red flag illegal financial transactions.143 This fact, in combination with the 
notoriously difficult to navigate webs of communication between legal and financial 
institutions, are undermining AML Compliance efforts and requiring the creation of 
more dynamic processes to keep apace with modern money laundering practices.  
 Once an AML compliance officer understands how to identify "suspicious 
activity", they should be trained to respond to such activity in an inquisitorial and 
non-accusatory manner.  The standard for reporting suspicious activity is if a 
                                                
142 Ibid.  
143 Stephen Jeffrey Weaver, Modern Day Money Laundering: Does the Solution 
Exist in an Expansive System of Monitoring and Record Keeping Regulations, 24 
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compliance officer "knows, suspects or has reason to suspect," but at times, there do 
exist commercially reasonable explanations for certain transactions. A more in depth 
evaluation of the transaction could simply allow for it to proceed or could unearth 
information a bank would need to gather in the case that it has indeed facilitated an 
illegal transaction and would need to call upon federal "Safe Harbor" clauses 
releasing it from liability.144 Any money laundering that is suspected to be related to 
terrorism activity should also be immediately reported to federal law enforcement 
authorities, notably the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") that is a 
unit within the US Treasury Department. An industry leading AML Compliance 
Department would also report any suspicious activity or proven illegal transaction to 
international authorities.  
 Cultivating a strong working relationship with international banking and 
AML authorities represents the last endeavour a banking compliance department 
may wish to pursue. The best-performing AML Compliance Departments support 
and contribute to the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory 
Practices and the premiere international organization, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF). As the only organization dedicated solely to the fight against money 
laundering, it is the nucleus of all issues related to AML and has representatives 
from 26 governments representing the world's financial centres.145 The FATF has 
also led to the creation of several satellite organizations that focus on money 
laundering in a particular region, such as the Caribbean FATF and the Asia-Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering.146 Apart from creating AML policy recommendations 
and promoting "name and shame" publications of the most egregious money 
                                                
144 IN GENERAL.--Any financial institution that makes a voluntary disclosure of 
any possible violation of law or regulation to a government agency or makes a 
disclosure pursuant to this subsection or any other authority, and any director, 
officer, employee, or agent of such institution who makes, or requires another to 
make any such disclosure, shall not be liable to any person under any law or 
regulation of the United States, any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or 
political subdivision of any State, or under any contract or other legally enforceable 
agreement (including any arbitration agreement), for such disclosure or for any 
failure to provide notice of such disclosure to the person who is the subject of such 
disclosure or any other person identified in the disclosure. From: Safe Harbor, 31 
USC 5318(g)(3). 
145 Peter Alldridge, Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil 
Recovery, Criminal Laundering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime p. 104 
(2003). 
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laundering entities, the FATF holds a wealth of information that can help banks 
piece together client identities and monitor money laundering trends on a global 
scale. The FATF's most important contribution to banks and their compliance 
departments is the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories Initiative which is 
pushing for the development of global norms in AML regimes. The FATF, through 
an international consensus-based initiative, passed forty recommendations regarding 
AML norms and established penalties for those countries/entities who do not adhere 
to or undermine these recommendations. In identifying problem countries and 
entities, banks have been able to better target what transactions to identify and what 
localities require heightened scrutiny.  
  
 An effective AML Compliance program should seek to familiarize itself with 
relevant AML legislation and regulations, implement comprehensive "Know Your 
Customer" procedures and ensure that all compliance officers are properly trained in 
identifying money laundering "red flags" and the prudent way to respond to them. 
Preventive measures cannot only lie in the present, but should also seek to engage 
those AML organizations that set banking industry standards and hold invaluable 
information that could shape the dynamic process that is a compliance program 
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 Having now explored several topics in legal compliance, it is useful to 
demonstrate how one such topic has played out in the modern business world on an 
international level. This chapter will provide a summary of the serious Bribery and 
Corrupt Practices compliance troubles experienced by the German electronics and 
electrical engineering company, Siemens, AG.  This case study will not only chart 
the facts, but highlight the egregious way that Siemens, AG upper management 
undermined even the most basic of compliance principles and efforts made by their 
compliance departments.  
 
Background: Siemens, AG 
 Siemens, AG is the largest European electronics and electrical engineering 
company, currently valued at over 90 billion dollars.147 Founded in Germany in 1847 
by Werner von Siemens, its first success came from its installation of sophisticated 
telegraphs, first within Germany and then expanding to the major markets of the 
United Kingdom and Russia.148 Soon, the company was dominating modernization 
efforts by European capital cities with its street lighting, electric trains and light 
bulbs.149 Bypassing those noxious business practices that saw Siemens, AG through 
the World Wars, the 1950s marked the period where the company began 
manufacturing computers, semi-conductors devices, washing machines, and even 
pacemakers.150 Today, while still maintaining a solid manufacturing division, 
Siemens, AG is a global leader in telecommunications, industrial transportation and 
energy production.  
 
Context of Siemens, AG Compliance Troubles 
 Siemens, AG's compliance problems stemmed from their efforts to expand 
out of Europe and into the developing markets across the globe. The opening of the 
21st century was a period of incredible growth in these markets and the opportunity 
                                                
147 Forbes Company Profiles, Siemens, AG, Available at: 
http://www.forbes.com/companies/siemens/. 
148 Siemens, AG, History: Milestones in the development of the company and 
technology, Available at: http://www.siemens.com/history/en/history/index.htm. 
149 Ibid.  
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to win government contracts for infrastructure was at an all time high.151  What was 
at stake were billion dollar contracts to complete the following: 
"...to design and build metro transit lines in Venezuela; 
metro trains and signaling devices in China; power plants in 
Israel; high voltage transmission lines in China; mobile 
telephone networks in Bangladesh; telecommunications 
projects in Nigeria; national identity cards in Argentina; 
medical devices in Vietnam, China and Russia; traffic 
control systems in Russia; refineries in Mexico; and mobile 
communications networks in Vietnam."152 
 
In order to gain a competitive advantage in the bidding process for these contracts, 
Siemens, AG officials took advantage of "opaque tendering procedures and poor 
governance"153 characteristic to the developing world governments by systematically 
offering bribes to become an insider, and thus preferred, firm. Bribery was seen as a 
tempting short cut to reach performance targets established by an especially 
aggressive Siemens, AG growth strategy.154 The use of bribes became endemic 
within the Siemens, AG culture,155 especially from the mid-1990s until 2006 when 
German and American authorities opened a bribery and corrupt practices 
investigation into the corporation.156   
 
Claims against Siemens, AG 
 Siemens, AG were investigated by both German157 and American authorities. 
This section will concentrate on the United States Department of Justice inquiry into 
the bribery and corrupt practices claims brought against the corporation.  
                                                
151 Simon. G. Evenett, Can developing countries benefit from negotiations on 
transparency in government procurement in the Doha Round?, Task Force 9 (Open, 
Rule-Based Trading System) of the United Nations Millennium Project (2005).  
152 Alexandra Wrage and Anne Richardson, Siemens AG, Violations of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 48 ILM 232, p. 234 (2009). 
153 Evenett, supra, p.3. 
154 Graham Dietz and Nicole Gillespie, The Recovery of Trust: Case studies of 
organisational failures and trust repair, Institute of Business Ethics, p.9 (2012). 
155 “Bribery was Siemens’s business model,” said Uwe Dolata, the spokesman for 
the association of federal criminal investigators in Germany. “Siemens had 
institutionalized corruption.” From: Siri Schubert and T. Christian Miller, At 
Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y. Times, December 20, 2008. 
156 Ibid.  
157 The Munich Public Prosecutor's corruption probe into Siemens, AG resulted in 
the corporation paying a settlement of USD 569 million, USD 145.3 million in profit 
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 In 2008, in a Washington, D.C. federal district court, Siemens, AG pleaded 
guilty to having violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act--Internal Controls and 
Books and Records Provisions. 158 The Department of Justice Statement of Offense 
against Siemens, AG is a laundry list of instances where the company planned for, 
executed, and disguised the payment of bribes to foreign officials in order to win 
large infrastructure contracts. With blessings from the executive management, 
Siemens, AG constructed a matrix of independent companies and subsidiaries to 
carry out these payments and avoid discovery by authorities. The most notorious 
example of one such matrix was that created to win a contract to execute the United 
Nations' Oil for Food Program (OFFP) in Iraq:  
25. Siemens S.A.S. of France ("Siemens France"), SIEMENS' 
regional company in France, entered into contracts for power 
station renovation, servicing, and spare parts, with the Iraqi 
government in connection with the United Nations Oil for Food 
Program. All of Siemens France's contracts under the United 
Nations Oil for Food Program (the "OFFP") were entered into in 
partnership with artificial subsidiaries. 
26. Siemens Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. of Turkey ("Siemens 
Turkey"), SIEMENS' 
regional company in Turkey, sold power and electrical equipment 
to the Iraqi government in connection with the OFFP. 
27. Osram Middle East FZE ("Osram Middle East") was the 
United Arab Emirates based subsidiary of Osram GmbH, which 
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of SIEMENS. Osram Middle East 
sold light bulbs and lighting equipment to the Iraqi government in 
connection with the OFFP. 
28. Gas Turbine Technologies S.p.A. ("GTT"), an Italian 
subsidiary of SIEMENS, contracted to sell gas turbines to the 
Iraqi government in connection with the OFFP. 
29. "OFFP Agent A," a Paraguayan company registered in Jordan, 
acted as an agent for Siemens France and Siemens Turkey in 
connection with sales to the Iraqi government made through the 
OFFP. 
30. "OFFP Agent B," an Iraqi citizen, acted as an agent for Osram 
Middle East in connection with sales to the Iraqi government 
made through the OFFP.159 
 
By using shell organizations in jurisdictions with weak rules on bribery, Siemens 
was able to transfer huge sums of money into foreign accounts specifically marked 
to be used for the bribery of Iraqi officials who chose the OFFP contractors. 
Siemens, AG project cost calculation sheets 
sometimes reflected "nützliche aufwendungen" ("NAs"), a common tax term literally 
                                                
Trautman, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Minefield for Directors, 6 Va. L. & 
Bus. Rev. 145, p.165 (2011). 
158 15 U.S.C. §§78m(b)(2), 78(b)(5), and 78ff(a). 
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translated as "useful expenditures" but partly understood by many employees to 
mean "bribes."160 The totality of Siemens, AG bribery funds was calculated to 
approximately $1,360,000,000, the highest amount ever identified as bribe payments 
in a legal proceeding.161 Through similar schemes162, Siemens, AG made 
exponentially more than the above sum in profits on their global contracts.  
 While Siemens, AG had a compliance department, it was intentionally 
undermined through underfunding and marginalization by executive management. In 
their Statement of Offense, the corporation accepted the US DOJ claim that it 
"knowingly failed to establish a 
sufficiently empowered and competent Corporate Compliance Office."163  Siemens, 
AG had a compliance department consisting of several lawyers, but they were 
encouraged to eschew their compliance duties and instead focus on defending the 
company against outside allegations unrelated to compliance.164 Testimony from 
compliance personnel also revealed that they received minimal training or direction 
regarding their compliance responsibilities.165 As a result, "Siemens routinely: (i) 
ignored red flags suggesting that improper payments were being made; (ii) failed to 
adequately investigate or follow up on the red flags; and (iii) failed to take 
disciplinary action against known wrongdoers."166 Worse still, even the most 
superficial of compliance mechanisms was subverted by executive management, 
highlighting that Siemens, AG compliance troubles were symptomatic of a poor 
"tone at the top" of the organization.  
 Executive management was at odds with compliance department efforts to 
create a code of conduct which Siemens, AG would hold as an ethical standard for 
                                                
160 Ibid., p. 7. 
161 Karl Sidhu, Anti‐Corruption Compliance Standards in the Aftermath of the 
Siemens Scandal, 10 German L. J. 1343, p. 1345 (2009).  
162 A last anecdote on the extent of Siemens, AG bribery schemes:  Pools of money 
for corrupt payments were often approved with forms equipped with removable 
Post-It notes on the signature line, thereby concealing the identity of the signatories 
by removing the notes should the company be investigated. From: Trautman, supra, 
p. 165.  
163 US DOJ Statement of Offense, supra, p. 36. 
164 Ibid., p. 3.  
165 Foley & Lardner, LLP. FCPA Compliance Lessons from the Record-Setting 
Siemens Enforcement Action (2009), Available at: http://www.foley.com/fcpa-
compliance-lessons-from-the-record-setting-siemens-enforcement-action-01-09-
2009/. 
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its business operations. The US DOJ statement described an environment where 
senior management "provided few strong messages regarding business ethics, 
including no clear statements that the company would rather lose business than 
obtain it through bribery."167 Under those circumstances, the compliance department 
drafted a code of conduct and distributed anti-corruption circulars throughout the 
organization but this so-called "paper program" was clearly not intended to make an 
impact on Siemens, AG business conduct on the ground. Referring back to the US 
Sentencing Guidelines discussed in Chapter 1, we recall specific mention of the 
uselessness of compliance programs that live up to the letter of ethical standards, but 
not the spirit of these last. The severity of the penalties Siemens, AG accepted at the 
conclusion of the US DOJ investigation reflects that the corporation lived up to 
neither word nor spirit.  
 
Summary of penalties against Siemens, AG 
 As a result of the above compliance failures, Siemens, AG incurred fines of 
USD 1.34 billion.168 Of note is the fact that this sum does not include the costs the 
company paid to conduct a comprehensive internal investigation as required by other 
US DOJ settlement stipulations. The internal investigation is estimated to have cost 
Siemens, AG another billion dollars: 
*  1.6 million billable hours logged by Siemens's Audit Committee 
counsel and the company's forensic auditor at a cost of over  $850 
million; 
*  1,750 interviews and 800 informational meetings concerning the 
company's operations in 34 countries; 
* administration, with approval from DOJ and the SEC, of two 
employee amnesty programs, which led to 100 employees coming 
forward with useful information; 
* over 100 million documents preserved and  80 million 
documents stored in an electronic database at a cost to Siemens of 
more than  $100 million; 
* analysis of  38 million transactions from Siemens's "Finavigate" 
accounting system and a review of  127 million accounting records 
related to those transactions; 
* more than  $5.2 million in document translation costs; and 
* more than  $150 million spent on the creation of an 
anticorruption kit for 162 distinct operating entities, including six 
weeks of auditors "on the ground" at each of the fifty-six entities 
determined to be a "high risk."169 
                                                
167 Ibid.  
168 See Appendix 1 for Siemens Sentencing Guidelines Calculations, From: US DOJ 
Siemens Sentencing Memorandum, p.12 (2008).  















Moreover, Siemens, AG assisted investigators in prosecuting third parties who also 
formed part of the bribery matrix and was given special mention within the US DOJ 
Sentencing Memorandum for its overall cooperation with the investigation. Amongst 
other efforts, Siemens, AG announced a new commercial strategy that would result 
in a temporary reduction of its commercial ventures in corruption hotspots.170 This 
effort was complemented by a Siemens, AG and World Bark initiative that would 
commit 15-years of support and USD 100 million to nonprofit organizations fighting 
corruption.171  
 
Rebuilding a Culture of Compliance 
 In 2008, at the conclusion of the US DOJ investigation, Siemens, AG made 
dramatic changes to executive management and to its compliance department. The 
company began by cleaning house: by 2009, Siemens, AG shed 600 employees for 
compliance deficiencies and put 2200 others under investigation for possible 
violations.172 It then hired 500 full‐time compliance officers worldwide (up from 
just 86 in 2006).173 There was also a distinct change in the "tone at the top" of the 
organization that provided the support necessary to accomplish extraordinary results 
within a small window of time: 
Siemens rolled out strict new rules and anti-
corruption/compliance processes...by hiring a former Interpol 
official to head its new investigation unit. It also established 
compliance hotlines, and an external ombudsman based 
worldwide and online. It created a web portal for employees to 
evaluate risk in their client and supplier interactions. 
In an attempt to change its internal culture, Siemens launched a 
comprehensive training and education programme on anti-
corruption practises for its employees. By end 2009, Siemens had 
trained more than half its 400,000-strong global workforce on 
anti-corruption issues.174 
Last, Siemens, AG replaced its "matrix" payment system structures with a more 
streamlined one comprising only three divisions, limiting the number of areas 
                                                
170 Dietz and Gillespie, supra, p. 10. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Richard Weiss and Rajiv Sekhri, Siemens Fires Brazil Head After Finding 
Compliance Violation, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, October 11, 2011.  
173 Sidhu, supra, p. 1345.  
174 Graham Dietz and Nicole Gillespie, Rebuilding trust: How Siemens atoned for its 
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compliance officers would need to investigate should questionable financial 
transactions surface. 175 These changes catapulted Siemens, AG from a company 
marred by scandal to one serving as a model for other corporate compliance 
departments worldwide.176 Today, Siemens, AG compliance department is often in 
the news for its ability to quickly detect and prevent corruption deals from taking 
place.177 
Conclusions 
 The Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act is an important piece of legislation 
that can result in severe financial and reputational penalties for a given corporation. 
For decades, Siemens, AG defied the ethical standards for business practice outlined 
in the statute, a decision that led to short-term profitability in global markets but 
ultimately led to a complete dismantling of the company. This case study serves to 
show that a response to compliance failures of such magnitude should be tackled 




                                                
175 Ibid. 
176 One compliance mechanism invented by Siemens, AG responds to problems that 
arise with using independent business consultants: now, a new state-of-the-art system 
requires any employee who wishes to engage a business consultant to enter detailed 
information into an interactive computer system, which assesses the risk of the 
engagement and directs the request to the appropriate supervisors for review and 
approval. The US DOJ described this mechanism as highlighting "the serious 
commitment of Siemens to ensure that it operates in a transparent, honest, and 
responsible manner going forward." From: US DOJ Sentencing Memorandum, supra, p. 
24.  
177 See Joe Palazzolo, Siemens Compliance Program Made The Catch, Company 















 While legal compliance is a dynamic field that garners the best results when 
compliance managers continually monitor and demonstrate sensitivity to the most 
current issues relevant to their field, there are some emerging compliance trends that 
could dramatically change the mechanics of corporate compliance departments. This 
chapter will discuss two trends that have elicited the most attention: the questionable 
necessity of implementing a corporate ombudsman office and the imperative of 
responding to the Internet's effect on compliance by developing an e-compliance 
division. The addition of a new corporate personality—i.e. the ombudsman— is 
touted by some as a welcome entity to alleviate the increasingly heavy burden of 
tasks allocated to the compliance department, a description that fuels opposing views 
that an ombudsman office is a redundancy. In contrast to the ombudsman discussion, 
is the consensus dominating the discourse on e-compliance: there must be a 
corporate compliance response to the dominance of the Internet and its related 
technologies. A short explanation of both issues follows.  
 
 Long a fixture in government administration, corporations are becoming 
more receptive to the idea of having a corporate ombudsman office to complement 
the work done by its compliance department. It is only in the last 25 to 30 years that 
private corporations have considered the benefits that an ombudsman office can 
bring to their operations.178 While the role of an ombudsman is subject to slight 
variations depending upon the corporation, there are "several consistent 
characteristics of the ombuds office that include neutrality, independence, 
informality, and confidentiality."179 A larger definition of the ombudsman is a person 
who acts as a "neutral or impartial manager within a corporation, who may provide 
confidential and informal assistance to managers and employees in resolving work 
related concerns, who may serve as a counselor, go-between, mediator, fact-finder, 
or upward feedback mechanism, and whose office is located outside ordinary line 
management structures."180 Maintaining a separation from the management hierarchy 
                                                
178 Eds. Rob Gregory and Phillip James Giddings, Righting Wrongs: The 
Ombudsman in Six Continents p. 11 (2000). 
179 M. Rowe, Options, Functions and Skills: What an Organizational Ombudsperson 
Might Want to Know, 2 Negotiation J. 2, p. 7 (1995). 











Emerging Issues in Corporate Legal Compliance 
 
 51 
is a key feature of the ombudsman office, however an ombudsman must still have 
access and support from upper management. In sum, the ombudsman office 
represents an informal entity that could extinguish issues that could later become 
large enough to warrant compliance department attention.  
 The informal quality of the ombudsman office has contributed to a dramatic 
drop in resource usage by compliance departments. In a first degree, corporations 
consistently bemoan the soaring monetary costs of compliance that are allocated to 
internal/external investigations, document review and storage, and corporate-wide 
training programs.181 A characteristic of the ombudsman office is that it does not 
maintain specific records of individuals or cases, nor does it conduct cumbersome 
investigations. In not maintaining such records, the ombudsman ensures that 
anonymous complaints/alerts remain such and cannot be retrieved later for 
retaliatory purposes elsewhere within the corporation. While the monetary savings 
are evident, there are also less tangible resource savings that are linked to having an 
ombudsman office. The informality of the office has been shown to encourage the 
reporting of incipient criminal, or even simply questionable, conduct by a 
corporation. Providing this less burdensome mechanism to report concerns signals 
that the corporation is not adverse to criticism and is committed to compliance with 
the law. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, mentioned prior, has indicated that the 
existence of a corporate ombudsman office positively affects the determination of 
the effectiveness of a compliance program during sanction mitigation hearings.182 
Further, from a strategic viewpoint, a corporation would be wise to consider the 
value of the "ombudsman privilege." In this day of fast-moving information, should 
a corporate ombudsman office hear of a potentially devastating corporate fallibility 
and have it resolved quickly by the compliance department, there is no obligation for 
the ombudsman to publically report. While the attorney-client privilege has been 
loosened over the years, six federal district court decisions have protected the 
ombudsman privilege of complete confidentiality of their knowledge and activities 
                                                
181 Pamela M. Green, The Cost Of Compliance, The Maine Banker, January 2013, 
Available at:  
http://onlinedigeditions.com/display_article.php?id=1288332. 
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to parties in a lawsuit.183 The ombudsman office could prove invaluable to the 
corporate public image.  
 In the least, a corporation can consider a lesser form of an ombudsman 
office: the board ombudsman. Instead of creating an entire office, the board 
ombudsman would represent a new and independent corporate personality that 
contributes to the traditional board of directors. Scholars suggest three core functions 
for this position: 
-Communicating information to the conflicts board to provide 
useful feedback on the implementation of corporate policies and 
other matters relevant to the board's responsibility 
-Serving as a safety net and early warning device for problems 
facing the corporation by providing an information outlet for 
whistleblowers 
- Operating as a change agent through recommendations to the 
board on policies, actions and procedures184  
 
The most compelling function amongst the three is that of "change agent." Many 
contemporary compliance problems have arisen from executive misconduct and 
disregard of burgeoning problems. "An important reason for having a [board] 
ombudsman is to prevent unethical behavior. The ombudsman serves as the 
conscience of the organization and can alert management to growing concerns or 
festering problems...It is said that the 'ombudsman was created not to clean up a 
mess, but, rather...to provide insurance against further messes.'"185 
Having such an influence present during everyday board operations could clearly 
affect the culture of a corporation and aid the compliance department’s efforts to 
cultivate a transparent organization. 
 Whereas the ombudsman office is viewed as a wise option for 
complementing a corporation's compliance department, the development of and 
attention given to e-compliance should be viewed as an imperative. E-compliance, 
an abbreviated form of electronic compliance denoting technology driven 
compliance, has arisen out of the Internet era. Even if one is not an "Internet" 
company, many corporate operations are conducted via services that are internet-
                                                
183 B. Thompson, Corporate Ombudsmen and Privileged Communications: Should 
Employee Communication to Corporate Ombudsmen Be Entitled to Privilege?, 61 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 653, p. 657 (2012).  
184 Banks, supra, p. 13-20. 
185 Brian Bloch and Nancy Erbe, The Organizational Ombudsman as Change Agent 
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based: banking, emailing, or even website development and maintenance. There is a 
false impression that passive behaviour such as having a company website would not 
require e-compliance services:  "A website needs to comply with traditional 
advertising and trademark laws, but it must also comply with newly enacted laws 
concerned with access by children and/or privacy."186 Active behaviour, such as 
having a corporate email network, can trigger corporate liability for creation of a 
hostile work environment as elucidated further here: 
Employees may circulate offensive jokes or pictures, which can 
subject the company to liability for sexual harassment. Employees 
may think that because salacious material is freely available on 
the Internet, and "free speech" is indeed in the Constitution, they 
have every right to circulate this kind of material at work. 
Unfortunately, it may result in liability for a corporation...as 
sexual harassment laws will impose liability on a corporation for 
creation of a hostile work environment.187 
 
Apart from the preceding irresponsible behaviour, there is also the real risk that 
employees could inadvertently reveal company trade secrets or strategy through 
improper use or understanding of e-compliance policies. Compliance departments 
must walk a fine line in establishing guidelines and anticipating Internet behaviour: 
lacking an Internet usage policy is indeed harmful, but the overregulation of 
technology usage can stifle creativity and performance amongst employees, 
potentially diminishing a corporation's edge in the marketplace. Note that the last 
examples represent e-compliance risks emanating from within a corporation, but 
there are also risks that issue from the behaviour of external entities.  
 There are certain fields where e-compliance initiatives are primarily focused 
on the actions of the public. The largest of these fields is the music and 
entertainment industry where Internet use for advertising and product disbursement 
ties in with copyright and trademark infringement. Returning to a field discussed 
earlier in this paper, e-compliance in Securities Law is becoming widely accepted as 
SOX compels certain type of corporate information—such as insider trades—to be 
posted online for public consideration.188 Within the banking sector, Anti-Money 
Laundering compliance has seen a drastic impact from client use of internet-based 
technologies and have significantly bolstered resources to e-compliance divisions. 
As noted in Chapter 3, the act of money laundering was a physical endeavour when 
                                                
186 Banks, supra, p. 9-3.  
187 Banks, supra, p. 9-14. 
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gangsters used 'laundromats' to make their proceeds appear to come from a 
legitimate enterprise. With the rise of the Internet, money laundering is increasingly 
done using Internet tools such as electronic money and stored value cards, these 
instruments undermining transfer rules because of their ease of transfer without 
bank/financial institution intervention. The use of the Internet to commit money 
laundering is called "cyberlaundering" and has led to the rise of the AML e-
compliance field.189 The processes AML Compliance departments used in the past to 
determine client identity and source of income have now been complicated by 
technology: 
Money launderers can use the Internet in a variety of ways: they 
can seamlessly transfer money to Internet banks, 33 they can use 
illegal Internet casinos as a mechanism to generate funds, 34 or 
they can even transfer electronic money to a private server which 
can be browsed by individuals using File Transfer Protocol 
("FTP"). 35 In order to understand the complications 
cyberlaunderers can create for enforcement agencies, one must 
understand the concepts of electronic money, stored value cards, 
and encryption technology.190 
 
As more corporations utilize the Internet to conduct their daily operations and 
facilitate global business, e-Compliance divisions will need to be allocated the 
requisite resources to grapple with issues arising from the rapid pace of Internet-
based technologies. Furthermore, legal compliance officers will inevitably require 
competency in not only law and business, but technology as well.  
 The rise of the corporate ombudsman and the necessity of e-compliance to 
the modern corporation represent only a few of the interesting emerging issues with 
the field of legal compliance. The dynamism of this field requires a certain level of 
openness from corporate management and reflects the how important reception to 
new ideas and processes is to the success of a modern corporation. 
                                                
189 Wendy J. Weimer, Note, Cyberlaundering: An International Cache for Microchip 
Money,  
13 DePaul Bus. L. J. 199, 199 n.1 (2001). 













 Once viewed as a subdivision of the traditional corporate in-house legal 
department, legal compliance is now given its due respect as a standalone 
department within the majority of corporations.  This change was less an organic 
corporate development and more a response to United States' courts increased 
receptivity to arguments imposing corporate liability for misconduct. Initially, 
classic definitions of respondeat superior were expanded to the scope necessary to 
impose liability, creating a body of case law that proved disadvantageous to 
corporations.  Later came a movement encouraging statutory provisions for 
corporate conduct, the two having the most impact being the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Coupled with the increased cooperation 
between global enforcement authorities that resulted in an exponential growth in 
prosecution for corporate violations, legal compliance became vital in preventing 
small issues from becoming those that attracted the attention of authorities.  
 Legal compliance is a diverse and dynamic field requiring knowledge of a 
range of legal subject areas and affecting many sectors. In this paper, we discussed 
the prominent fields of Antitrust and Bribery & Corrupt Practices Compliance, but 
could very well have discussed compliance issues involving insurance or education 
law. There are just as many types of corporations that utilize compliance 
departments as there are subject areas; here, the banking sector was explored via a 
discussion of its anti-money laundering compliance programs. This program is 
crucial to ascertaining whether funds circulating through financial institutions have 
been derived from legitimate business operations.  
 The lesson learned through the Siemens, AG case study illustrates the 
importance of conducting sound business operations in even the most legally far-
removed markets. For over a decade, Siemens, AG systematically exploited markets 
with weak governance standards through the payment of bribes to government 
officials in order to win lucrative infrastructure projects. Despite having a 
compliance department, executive management intentionally undermined its efforts 
by understaffing, overburdening, and simply, ignoring it. This so-called "paper 
[compliance] program" resulted in Siemens, AG having to pay the largest ever 
Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act enforcement settlement. What resulted was a 
dramatic turnaround through changes in the "tone at the top" of the company and a 
company-wide overhaul that included hiring compliance specialists and training all 













compliance departments worldwide. One reason why Siemens, AG was able to make 
such a turnaround was its openness to emerging ideas within the compliance 
community.  
 The emerging issues in corporate compliance explored in this paper include 
the rise of a new corporate personality, the ombudsman, and the increased attention 
given to e-compliance. While the office of the ombudsman was not put into place at 
Siemens, AG, many corporations are seeing the value in having an independent 
entity that complements their compliance departments through more informal means.  
From a strategic viewpoint, the "ombudsman privilege" can prove invaluable to a 
corporation in a sector vulnerable to compliance failures as the risk of incipient 
issues being publicized can be minimized from its usage. What was once viewed as 
strategic but is now a corporate imperative is the attention given to e-compliance. 
The internet and its related technologies are forcing compliance operations to 
navigate a new, increasingly legislated, landscape: online operations. For the modern 
corporation, e-compliance is unavoidable.  
 Although throughout history corporations have taken a reactive stance to 
government crackdowns on their conduct, the attention and allocation of resources to 
compliance departments amongst today's corporations perhaps signals a change in 
ethos. The new norm? Prevention of problems via proactive means developed by 
corporate compliance departments, in lieu of reactive measures from legal 
departments. Effective use of corporate compliance departments should usher in a 
culture of good governance that will be reflected in improved corporate conduct 
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